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Although numerous articles have been written about the various
legislative and regulatory options available to control greenhouse gases,
only a handful of these articles have focused on implementation and
enforcement. Enforcement plays an essential role in the success of any
environmental program. While many countries have well-written
environmental laws that contain laudatory goals, only a few of these
countries have the enforcement resources and expertise necessary to
achieve the kind of results that the United States has been able to achieve.
As the United States considers how best to address climate change, it is
important to consider how the various legislative and regulatory options
will be enforced so as to ensure that the ultimate objectives of the programs
will be achieved.1
As part of the University of San Diego Law School’s Second Annual
Climate and Energy Law Symposium, we decided to review the
enforcement provisions of the main federal greenhouse gas control
options, with a view to drawing lessons from that review that could
inform policy choices and program design. Our review suggests that
there are relative strengths and weaknesses, as well important tradeoffs
to be made, in the enforcement provisions of each of the leading
candidate programs. Our review further suggests that some revisions
should be made to these provisions to help ensure that the greenhouse
gas control programs meet their environmental goals.
This paper is divided into three sections. Section I provides an
overview of the main legislative and regulatory options being considered
at the federal level to control greenhouse gases. These include cap-andtrade programs, carbon tax proposals, as well as existing authority under
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).2 In Section II, we compare these options
from an enforcement perspective, considering regulatory complexity,
monitoring, reporting and verification, the roles of states and of citizens,
transparency in government, and penalties, in order to tease out the
1. Enforcement also provides secondary benefits that should not be underestimated. A
strong, transparent, and fair enforcement system contributes to the development and
respect of t he rule of law. It also provides citizens an opportunit y t o be involved
in environmental improvement through citizen suits and complaints. Strong monitoring
and reporting provisions can also help to inform the public about the extent and sources
of greenhouse gases, which—beyond providing a basis for citizen suits and complaints—
can exert its own pressure on sources to reduce emissions.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
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important differences among the options and draw lessons for program
design and implementation.3 Section III summarizes our conclusions.
I. OVERVIEW

OF GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL OPTIONS

Identifying viable federal greenhouse gas control options in 2010 is
like playing whack-a-mole: the options seem to change daily because of
shifting political winds blown by unpredictable factors like the economy
and disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. What has not
changed, however, are the basic tools at the disposal of Congress and the
Obama Administration to tackle greenhouse gas emissions: cap-andtrade systems, carbon taxes, and the provisions of the CAA. Accordingly,
although the precise details of any eventual law or program may differ,
we focus on these tools and outline their relevant provisions in this section.
A. Cap-and-Trade Programs
Several proposals for a cap-and-trade program have already been
introduced in both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives with
varying degrees of success. Given their importance, below we provide
an overview of how cap-and-trade programs are generally structured.
We then explain the importance of enforcement in these programs, using
the Acid Rain Program as an example. After this, we examine three capand-trade proposals that have received the most attention to date.
In a cap-and-trade program, a cap is set on the total amount of
pollutants that can be emitted by regulated entities during a fixed
compliance period. The cap is then divided into emission allowances and
distributed, either through direct allocations or through an auction.4
Allowances are tradable, although there may be restrictions on who may
buy or sell them. At the end of each compliance period, regulated
entities must submit a sufficient number of allowances to cover their

3. We focus on civil penalties. The criminal provisions of the various options are
beyond the scope of this paper.
4. See Lesley K. M cAllister, Putting Persuasion Back in the Equation: Compliance in
Cap and Trade Programs, 24 PACE ENVTL . L. REV. 299, 315 (2007) [hereinafter Persuasion].
For a more detailed description of cap and trade, see Pew Center on Global Climate
Change & t he P ew Center on t he St ates , Climate Change 101: Cap and Trade (Jan.
2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Cap-Trade-101-02-2008.pdf.
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emissions during that period.5 Regulated entities that have insufficient
allowances are assessed penalties.
Because regulated entities have the option of trading allowances in
order to meet their compliance obligations, a market for emission
allowances is created. This market is particularly active where entities
face varying costs to abate their emissions. Indeed, “[w]here costs are
different, there is ‘room for a deal,’ as high-cost sources have the incentive
to buy allowances from low-cost sources.”6 Costs can be further reduced
by allowing the use of offset credits, which are emissions reductions
from non-regulated sources that would not otherwise have occurred and
that can be used by regulated sources to demonstrate compliance. A capand-trade program therefore provides regulated entities flexibility in
achieving compliance obligations while reducing the overall costs of
abating emissions.7
Although cap-and-trade programs use a market mechanism, they are
in fact regulatory programs that need a rigorous enforcement system in
place in order to properly develop.8 In the absence of such a system,
regulated entities would be able to underreport their emissions, allowing
them to submit fewer allowances than necessary to cover their emissions
during the compliance period.9 This would lead to environmental
objectives not being met: if emissions are underreported, “the cap may
be reported as being met, but not be met in fact.”10 In addition, the
market would not function properly. This is because regulated entities
that underreport their emissions would be able to sell their excess
allowances on the market, not only providing them with an unfair
advantage, but also increasing the supply of allowances in the market.
This, in turn, would inappropriately decrease the value of the allowances,

5. See Lesley K. M cAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL . L. 395, 398 (2009).
6. Stephanie Benkovic & Joseph Kruger, To Trade or Not to Trade? Criteria for
Applying Cap and Trade, Optimizing Nitrogen Management in Food and Energy Production
and Environmental Protection: Proceedings of the 2nd International Nitrogen Conference on
Science and Policy, T HE SCIENTIFIC WORLD 1, 3 (2001) [hereinafter To Trade or Not to
Trade].
7. A. Denny Ellermanet al., Emissions Trading in the U.S.: Experience, Lessons,
and Considerations for Greenhouse Gases, Pew Center on Global Climate Change i, iii
(M ay 2003), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/
emissions_trading [hereinafter Emissions Trading in the U.S.].
8. See John Schakenbach et al., Fundamentals of Successful Monitoring, Reporting,
and Verification Under a Cap-and-Trade Program, 56 J. AIR & WASTE M GMT. ASS’N 1576,
1578 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter Fundamentals].
9. Persuasion, supra note 4, at 318.
10. Id.; see also To Trade or Not to Trade, supra note 6, at 3.
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depriving other legitimate allowance holders some of the value of their
emissions reductions.11
At the same time, markets are built on the confidence that market
participants have in the market itself. As the financial meltdown of 2008
showed, when any key element of a market loses participant confidence,
the entire market can freeze or cease to function.12 In order to instill
confidence in the integrity of the market, a rigorous enforcement system,
including appropriate monitoring, reporting and verification, is needed.13
A rigorous enforcement system instills confidence in the market “by
verifying the existence and value of the traded allowance,”14 thereby
allowing market participants to “manage the risks inherent in
environmental projects and market-based programs.”15
Experience with the Acid Rain Program has shown that enforcement
is essential to the success of a cap-and-trade program. The Acid Rain
Program, which was established under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments, requires the progressive reduction of SO2 emissions
from certain electric power utilities.16 Under the program, emissions of
SO2 are to be reduced to a level of 8.95 million tons annually, or
approximately half of their 1980 levels, by 2010.17 The “centerpiece” of
the Acid Rain Program is its cap-and-trade system.18 Similar to the basic

11. See Persuasion, supra note 4, at 318.
12. See generally Supplemental Notice for the Proposed National Emissions Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 69 Fed. Reg. 12,398, 12,412–13 (M ar. 16, 2004) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
13. See, e.g., id. (consistent and efficient enforcement of rules is important for success
of mercury trading market).
14. Lesley K. M cAllister, Beyond Playing “Banker”: The Role of the Regulatory
Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN . L. REV. 269, 282 (2007) [hereinafter Beyond
Playing Banker].
15. Kenneth J. M arkowitz & M eredith R. Koparova, Compliance Is Essential to the
Environmental and Financial Integrity of Carbon Markets in INECE Special Report on
Climate Compliance 7 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.inece.org/climate/Special Report
ClimateCompliance.pdf [hereinafter Compliance].
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (1990). See EPA , Clean Air Markets: Emission,
Compliance, and Market Data, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/ARP_1.html (last
visited Jan. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Emission, Compliance, and Market Data].
17. See EPA, Clean Air Markets: SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading Under
the Acid Rain Program, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/s02.html (last visited
Jan. 11, 2010) [hereinafter SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading]; see also Dallas Burtraw
& Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An Analysis of the Clean Air Act’s
Acid Rain Program, 26 ENVTL . L. REP . 10,411, 10,413 (1996) [hereinafter New Standard
of Performance].
18. See SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading, supra note 17.
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structure of any cap-and-trade program, allowances are distributed to
regulated entities, which are entitled to emit one ton of SO2 for each
allowance held. Allowances are freely tradable. At the end of each
compliance period, regulated entities must submit a sufficient number of
allowances to cover their emissions during that period or be assessed a
penalty.
This SO2 cap-and-trade program has been credited with achieving an
“unprecedented level of environmental protection in a cost-effective
manner.”19 In fact, a 2003 U.S. Office of Management and Budget study
found that the “Acid Rain P rogram has accounted for the largest
quantified human health benefits of any federal regulatory program
implemented in the last 10 [years], with annual benefits exceeding costs
by [greater than] 40 to 1.”20 This program has been “widely recognized
as a resounding success.”21
Several commentators have attributed the success of the Acid Rain
Program to its rigorous enforcement system. 22 Under the program,
regulated entities are required to continuously monitor their SO2 emissions,
with most entities using continuous emissions monitoring systems
(“CEMS”).23 CEMS are required to record emissions data every 15
minutes.24 These data, which must be consolidated and reported to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) on a quarterly basis, are
considered to be “the ‘gold standard’ that backs up the currency of
emission allowances.”25 Indeed, CEMS have been “essential for accurately
19. To Trade or Not to Trade, supra note 6, at 1.
20. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1576; see also EPA, Cap and Trade: Acid Rain
Program Results, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/cap-trade/docs/ctresults.pdf (last visited Jan.
20, 2010).
21. Jonas M onast, Climate Change and Financial Markets: Regulating the Trade
Side of Cap and Trade, 40 ENVTL . L. REP . NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,051, 10,052 (Jan. 2010)
[hereinafter Financial Markets].
22. Compliance, supra note 15, at 5 (stating that the success of the Acid Rain Program
was a “direct result of the strong monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements”);
see also Emission Trading in the U.S., supra note 7, at 16.
23. See EPA, Clean Air Markets: Acid Rain Program, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/
progsregs/arp/basic.html#cem (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). Thirty-six percent (36%) of
these entities, which account for 96% of SO2 emissions under the program, use CEM S. See
Persuasion, supra note 4, at 319. The other entities determine their emissions through certain
proxies. For example, units burning natural gas may determine emissions by multiplying
the sulfur content of gas (measured by daily sampling and analysis) by the volume of gas
combusted. See U.S. EPA, Clean Air Markets: Continuous Emissions Monitoring Fact Sheet,
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/emissions/continuous-factsheet.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
24. Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility
Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean
Air Act, 14 T UL . ENVTL . L.J. 309, 321 (2001) [hereinafter Environmental Laws].
25. Blas Perez Henriquez, Information Technology: The Unsung Hero of Market
Based Environmental Policies, 152 RESOURCES 9, 11 (2004), available at http://www.
rff.org/Publications/Resources/Documents/152/RFF_Resources_152_infotech.pdf.
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quantifying [SO2 emissions] and that accuracy in turn promotes smoothly
operating markets and environmental integrity.”26 At the same time, the
program imposes severe penalties on entities that fail to comply with
emission caps: for each ton of SO2 emitted in excess of the cap, a
regulated entity must pay a fine of $2,000, well above the less-than-$300
market value for a ton of SO2 .27 In addition to paying a fine, entities must
forfeit allowances from future years to cover their excess emissions, and
may be subject to criminal and civil penalties. Penalties are assessed
immediately and automatically.28 As a result of these high penalties and
strict monitoring, “there has been virtually 100 percent compliance with
[the Acid Rain Program’s] emission [caps] with little need for enforcement
action.”29 This program therefore “shows that cap-and-trade schemes—
with sufficient compliance and enforcement regimes—can deliver
substantial environmental benefits at low costs.”30
Recognizing the success of the Acid Rain Program, enforcement of a
greenhouse gas program will likely pose unique challenges. In fact, there
are likely to be several important differences between the Acid Rain
Program and any greenhouse gas program that will likely make enforcement
of greenhouse gas caps more challenging than enforcement of SO2 caps.
These include:
• The number of greenhouse gas pollutants being regulated;
• The number and variety of sources of these pollutants;
• The sophistication of the regulated sources with air pollution
controls and markets; and
• The role of offsets.
In light of these differences, the manner in which the various greenhouse
gas programs approach enforcement will likely have a significant effect
on their success.

26. Id.
27. Clearing prices for SO2 allowances have ranged widely, peaking at $860 per
ton and going as low as $36 per ton. Clearing prices have averaged roughly $300 per ton
over the life of the Acid Rain Program. See generally http://www.epa.gov/airmarket/trading/
auction.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
28. Environmental Laws, supra note 24, at 403–04. From 1995 until 2004, only 23 units
were found to be out of compliance, emitting 1,195 tons of excess emissions. The EPA
assessed fines totaling $3,856,513 for these violations. In addition, EPA has assessed fines
totaling $589,805 for nine monitoring violations. See Persuasion, supra note 4, at 321–22.
29. New Standard of Performance, supra note 17, at 10,422.
30. Compliance, supra note 15, at 5.
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To review potential federal greenhouse gas cap-and-trade programs,
we will focus on three cap-and-trade bills that have garnered the most
attention to date: the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
(“Waxman-Markey”),31 the discussion draft of the American Power Act
(“Kerry-Lieberman”)32 and the Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s
Renewal Act (“Cantwell-Collins”).33 These bills have important differences
that highlight how upfront program design may result in enforcement
deficiencies that threaten a program’s environmental integrity.
1. The Waxman-Markey Bill
On June 26, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
Waxman-Markey, which, among other things, establishes a cap-andtrade system to facilitate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions across
most of the U.S. economy. Specifically, the bill requires the progressive
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from the entire economy so that:
•
•
•
•

By 2012, emissions
By 2020, emissions
By 2030, emissions
By 2050, emissions

are reduced to 97% of 2005 levels;
are reduced to 80% of 2005 levels;
are reduced to 58% of 2005 levels; and
are reduced to 17% of 2005 levels.34

The bill sets forth similar emission reduction goals for regulated
entities.35 Under the bill, seven gases are designated as greenhouse
gases: carbon dioxide (CO2 ), methane (CH4 ), nitrous oxide (N2 O), sulfur
hexafluoride (SF6 ), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs)
and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3 ).36 All greenhouse gases are measured in
terms of their CO2 equivalence value.37 Entities regulated under the bill
include, among others, electricity producers, greenhouse gas importers
and stationary sources that emit 25,000 or more tons of CO2 equivalence
(“major GHG source”).38
In order to achieve its emission reduction goals, Waxman-Markey
establishes an emission allowance system, whereby a fixed number of

31. American Clean Energy and Security A ct , H .R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009)
[hereinafter Waxman-Markey].
32. American Power A ct , S. D is cussion D raft, 111t h Cong. (2010) [hereinafter
Kerry-Lieberman].
33. Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal, S. 2877, 111th Cong. (2009)
[hereinafter Cantwell-Collins].
34. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 702.
35. Id. § 703.
36. In addition to these gases, EPA has the authority to designate any other
anthropogenic gas as a greenhouse gas for purposes of the bill. Id. § 711(a).
37. Id. § 712.
38. Id. § 700(13).
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allowances are distributed annually. Each allowance represents one ton
of CO2 equivalence value.39 Regulated entities are required to hold a
sufficient number of allowances at the end of each compliance period in
order to cover their greenhouse gas emissions during that period.
In addition to holding emission allowances, regulated entities may
also satisfy a part of their compliance obligations through the use of
offset credits. Offset credits may be issued for projects or activities that
would not otherwise have occurred and which avoid, reduce or sequester
greenhouse gas emissions. Waxman-Markey limits the number of offset
credits that may be used each year in lieu of emission allowances to two
billion, with one offset credit equal to one emission allowance.40
Under the bill, EPA is responsible for establishing an offsets program
and must, among other things, promulgate regulations to ensure that
offset credits represent verifiable, additional and permanent greenhouse gas
reductions.41 EPA is also responsible for establishing a list of projects
that will be eligible to generate domestic and international offsets.42 In
order to protect the integrity of the offsets program, the bill creates an
independent Offsets Integrity Advisory Board. The board is required to
make recommendations to EPA for its use in promulgating regulations,
as well as in other aspects of the program.43
For offsets related to domestic agricultural and forestry sources, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), and not EPA, is given
authority to establish an offsets program. Similar to EPA’s offsets
program, Waxman-Markey requires USDA to ensure that credits generated
under its offsets program represent verifiable, additional and permanent
greenhouse gas reductions.44 To this end, USDA is required to prepare a
list of domestic agricultural and forestry practice types that are eligible

39. Initially, the majority of allowances will be distributed for free to entities identified
under the bill. The remaining allowances will be auctioned in accordance with the guidelines
set forth in the bill. Over time, the number of allowances that will be auctioned will begin to
increase, with approximately 70% of allowances being auctioned by 2030. Pew Center
on Global Climate Change, At a Glance: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
available at http://www.pew climate.org/docUploads/Waxman-Markey-short-summaryrevised-June26.pdf.
40. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 722(d)(1). This limit may be increased in
certain circumstances. Id. Starting in 2018, entities will require 1.25 international offset
credits for every emission allowance. Id.
41. Id. § 732(a), (b).
42. Id. § 733.
43. Id. § 731(a).
44. Id. § 502.
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to generate offset credits.45 The USDA is also required to establish its
own advisory committee to provide scientific and technical advice on its
offsets program, as well as to ensure the environmental integrity of the
program.46
Waxman-Markey allows emission allowances and offset credits to be
freely traded.47 Oversight of the allowance and offset market is the
responsibility of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”),
while oversight of the derivatives market is the responsibility of the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). In addition, the
President is required to establish a working group, which is to include
EPA and representatives of other “relevant” agencies, in order to make
recommendations to CFTC regarding “proposed regulations for the
establishment, operation, and oversight of markets for regulated allowance
derivatives.”48
The greenhouse gas provisions of Waxman-Markey are to be
implemented and enforced through the existing system of CAA permits,
specifically Title V operating permits. 49 EP A implements these
requirements through the states: states adopt programs that are at least as
stringent as the federal requirements and EPA certifies that the programs
adhere to federal standards, thus authorizing the states to implement the
CAA. This means that most regulated entities will submit permit
applications to their state air authorities, which will implement and
enforce these requirements. The major exception is that EPA will retain
oversight of the central emissions and offset trading market through
recording and tracking credits.50
2. The Kerry-Lieberman Bill
Although Waxman-Markey passed the House of Representatives in
the 111th Congress, the future of greenhouse gas control options in the
Senate is highly uncertain. No cap-and-trade approach appears to have
reasonable prospects of passage in the 112th Congress given the 2010
Congressional election results. Until mid-2010, the leading option was
Kerry-Lieberman, which was released in discussion draft form on May
12, 2010. Kerry-Lieberman requires the progressive reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions in order to meet certain economy-wide targets,

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
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which are similar to those set forth in Waxman-Markey.51 In addition,
Kerry-Lieberman designates substantially the same gases as greenhouse
gases, regulates substantially the same entities and uses substantially the
same emission allowance system as Waxman-Markey.52
One of the salient differences between Waxman-Markey and KerryLieberman relates to the offsets program. Like Waxman-Markey,
Kerry-Lieberman allows regulated entities to satisfy part of their
compliance obligations through the use of offset credits.53 USDA and
EPA are to share responsibility over the offsets program: USDA is
responsible for administering the domestic agriculture and forestry
offsets program, while EPA is responsible for administering the rest of
the program.54 Unlike Waxman-Markey, Kerry-Lieberman requires USDA
and EPA to work together more closely in implementing their programs.
For example, USDA and EPA are required to jointly: (1) establish the
domestic offsets program; 55 (2) establish an advisory committee to
provide scientific and technical advice regarding the domestic program;56
and (3) promulgate regulations in order to implement the domestic
program.57
It is nonetheless important to note that, even though Kerry-Lieberman
requires a joint effort between USDA and EPA in regards to domestic
offsets, USDA still retains significant independent authority to implement
the agricultural and forestry-related offsets program. Indeed, USDA is
the “lead agency” for agricultural and forestry-related offset projects,
and USDA alone establishes and maintains a list of projects eligible to
generate offset credits,58 approves offset projects,59 and conducts random
audits and reviews of those projects.60

51. Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 702.
52. Id. §§ 700(12), 722(a). Certain entities, including industrial sources, will not be
regulated until 2016. See id. § 722(c).
53. Id. § 722(d)(1)(A).
54. Id. § 733(c).
55. Id. § 733(a)(1)(A).
56. Id. § 732(a)(1).
57. Id. § 733(a)(1)(B).
58. Id. § 734(a)(1). USDA is required to provide an explanation if this list differs
from the recommendations of the joint advisory committee. Id. § 734(a)(2).
59. Id. § 736(b).
60. Id. § 739. Kerry-Lieberman does, however, require audit protocols and guidelines
to be jointly developed by EPA and USDA. See id. § 739(a).
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3. The Cantwell-Collins Bill
Another option pending in the U.S. Senate is Cantwell-Collins, which
was introduced on December 11, 2009.61 Similar to Waxman-Markey
and Kerry-Lieberman, Cantwell-Collins requires the progressive reduction
of greenhouse gases in order to meet certain economy-wide targets.62
These targets are the same as those set forth in Waxman-Markey and
Kerry-Lieberman. In addition, under Cantwell-Collins, substantially the
same gases are identified as greenhouse gases as under Waxman-Markey
and Kerry-Lieberman.63
In order to assist in meeting the economy-wide targets, CantwellCollins requires the Secretary of the Treasury (the “Secretary”) to establish
by regulation a program within the Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”)
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.64 This program is not explicitly tied
to the economy-wide targets set forth in the bill. Indeed, under the
program, the Secretary is only required to place a progressively declining
limit on the amount of “fossil carbon” permitted to be sold into U.S.
commerce.65 As a result, the program captures CO2 emissions and not
any other greenhouse gas.66 In addition, the emission reduction goals
for fossil carbon are not clearly defined. Rather, Cantwell-Collins
requires the President, in consultation with the Secretary, EPA and the
Secretary of Energy, to establish the maximum quantity of fossil carbon,
and the corresponding number of emission allowances (called “carbon
shares” in the Act), that are permitted to be introduced into U.S.
commerce starting in calendar year 2012. This quantity must equal “the
approximate level of fossil carbon likely to be required” by the U.S.
economy in that year and will remain at the same level for calendar
years 2013 and 2014.67 Then, starting in 2015, this quantity is to be

61. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33.
62. Id. § 3.
63. Unlike Waxman-M arkey and K erry-Lieberman, Cantw ell-Collins does not
specifically designate NF3 as a greenhouse gas. Cantwell-Collins does, however, include a
provision similar to Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman that allows EPA to include “any
other anthropogenically emitted gas that [it], after notice and comment, determines to
contribute to climate change.” Id. § 2(12)(G).
64. Id. § 4(a)(1).
65. The term “fossil carbon” is defined as “(A) carbon in the form of a fossil fuel
(such as coal, natural gas, and crude oil) in the raw state in which the fossil fuel exists at
the time the fossil fuel is removed from the Earth; and (B) the carbon content of imported
refined fuel products (such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuels) derived from a fossil fuel.”
Id. § 2(11).
66. The bill contains the “sense of the Senate” urging the federal government to
take further actions to “decrease the risks associated with greenhouse gas emissions” from
fossil carbon sources. Id. § 7(2).
67. Id. §§ 4(a)(2)(A)(ii), 4(a)(2)(B)(i).
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reduced by 0.25% each year from the previous calendar year.68 The
President is entitled to modify this quantity in order to respond to certain
factors set forth in the bill, but any such modification must be approved
by Congress through a joint resolution.69
Only “upstream” sources of fossil carbon are to be regulated under the
program. Specifically, only “first sellers” are required to periodically
surrender carbon shares to the Secretary.70 First sellers are defined as
entities that are “in the business of producing or importing fossil carbon
or production process carbon, as determined by the Secretary.”71 Although
the Secretary has the discretion to determine which entities are first
sellers for purposes of the bill, it has been estimated that 2,000 entities
would be regulated under such a program.72 First sellers are required to
surrender carbon shares within two years after the date on which fossil
carbon is introduced into U.S. commerce, combusted or released by a
first seller, or transferred as a royalty-in-kind.73
Cantwell-Collins establishes a fairly limited market for carbon shares.
Each carbon share represents one ton of fossil carbon.74 In order to
obtain carbon shares, first sellers must purchase them from one of two
sources: a monthly auction conducted by the Secretary, or a public
carbon share exchange established and administered by the Secretary.
The only entities eligible to participate in the auctions are first sellers.75
Similarly, the only entities eligible to purchase carbon shares on the
carbon share exchange are first sellers.76 First sellers are prohibited
from either directly or indirectly creating, purchasing, selling, or trading
carbon share derivatives.77 The Secretary, in consultation with CFTC,
FERC, and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), is nonetheless
required to promulgate regulations to establish markets for carbon share

68. Id. § 4(a)(2)(B)(ii).
69. Id. § 4(a)(3)(C).
70. Id. § 4(a)(1)(B).
71. Id. § 2(10). The term “production process carbon” is defined as “the quantity
of fossil carbon used to manufacture an energy-intensive commodity.” Id. § 2(14).
72. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL . L. REV. 293, 313 (2008) [hereinafter Meaningful]. Stavins
refers to upstream regulation as regulation “at the point of fossil fuel extraction, import,
processing, or distribution.” Id. at 309.
73. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33, § 4(a)(1)(B) (2009).
74. Id. § 2(4).
75. Id. § 4(b)(2).
76. Id. § 4(b)(7)(A).
77. Id. § 4(b)(8)(A).

99

SCHANG- CHA N VISUAL (D O N OT D EL ET E)

3/11/2016 1:31 PM

derivatives within one year of the bill’s enactment. These regulations are
to provide for effective and comprehensive market oversight; prohibit
fraud, market manipulation and excessive speculation; and limit
unreasonable or excessive fluctuations in the price of carbon shares and
carbon share derivatives.78
Cantwell-Collins further limits the market for carbon shares by largely
eliminating offsets. Under the bill, only three types of offset activities are
eligible to generate carbon shares: (1) carbon capture and storage
facilities, (2) oil or gas re-injection projects, and (3) the manufacture of
products with embedded fossil carbon.79 Entities that receive carbon
shares from these activities will be granted limited access to the public
carbon share exchange for the purpose of selling their shares to eligible
first sellers.80 Information relevant to the transaction, including transaction
dates, carbon share quantities, and prices, are to be made available to the
public “on a real-time basis.”81
B. Regulating Greenhouse Gases Using a Carbon Tax
Another market-based approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions
is a carbon tax. Under a carbon tax, a fee is levied on each ton of CO2
emitted or each ton of carbon contained in fossil fuels.82 The tax
motivates regulated entities to reduce their emissions if the cost of doing
so is less than the cost of paying the tax.83 As a result, a carbon tax
differs from a cap-and-trade program in a fundamental respect: a tax sets
an “upper limit” on the costs of reducing emissions.84 This creates
certainty in regards to costs.85 At the same time, unlike a cap-and-trade
program, a carbon tax does not set an upper limit on the amount of
emissions in a given year. Any reduction in emissions would therefore
be dependent on whether, in that year, the costs of emission reductions
were less than the carbon tax, leaving reductions subject to such
variables as weather, availability of new carbon reduction technologies

78. Id. § 4(b)(8)(B).
79. Id. § 4(c).
80. Id. § 4(b)(7)(B).
81. Id. § 4(b)(7)(A).
82. U.S. CONG . BUDGET OFFICE , POLICY OP TIONS FOR REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS
vii (2008), available at http://w w w .cbo.gov/ft p docs /89xx/doc8934/02-12-Carbon.pdf
[hereinafter Policy Options].
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M . Uhlmann, Combating Global
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap
and Trade, 28 STAN . ENVTL . L.J. 3, 36 (2009) [hereinafter Better Response].
85. Better Response, supra note 84, at 36.
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and levels of economic activity.86 This creates uncertainty in regards to
the amount of greenhouse gases that will be emitted in a given year.
Although there are no carbon tax proposals pending in the U.S.
Senate, a number of such proposals have been introduced in the U.S.
House of Representatives. These include the Save Our Climate Act of
2009 (the “Save Our Climate Act”)87 and America’s Energy Security
Trust Fund Act of 2009 (“AESTFA”).88 The Save Our Climate Act,
which was introduced in the House on January 15, 2009, proposes to
reduce CO2 emissions by amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(the “Code”) to impose an upstream tax on “taxable fuels.”89 Under the
bill, the term “taxable fuels” is defined to mean coal, natural gas,
petroleum, and any petroleum product that is “extracted, manufactured
or produced in the United States or entered into the United States for
consumption, use, or warehousing.”90 The tax starts at $10 per ton of
carbon content in the taxable fuel, increasing by $10 each year until the
second year after CO2 emissions are reduced to 20% of 1990 levels.91 At
that time, the tax will be frozen. 92 The tax is to be imposed on
manufacturers, producers and importers of taxable fuels at the time of
sale.93 The bill does, however, provide certain tax credits and exemptions.
These include a credit for embedded or sequestered carbon, as well as an
exemption for exports.94 It should be noted that, unlike the cap-andtrade programs described above, the bill does not set forth a separate
enforcement scheme, and presumably, the enforcement provisions of the
Code would apply.
AESTFA, which was introduced in the House on March 5, 2009, is
similar to the Save Our Climate Act. Like the Save Our Climate Act,
AESTFA focuses on reducing CO 2 and not any other greenhouse
gas.95 It proposes to do so by amending the Code to impose an upstream

86. Policy Options, supra note 82, at ix.
87. Save Our Climate Act of 2009, H.R. 594, 111th Cong. (2009).
88. America’s Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2009, H.R. 1337, 111th Cong.
(2009).
89. Save Our Climate Act, supra note 87, § 3(a).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The use of a taxable fuel by a manufacturer, producer or importer of such
fuel is treated as a sale for purposes of the bill.
94. Id.
95. AESTFA, supra note 88, § 2(a).
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tax on “taxable carbon substances.”96 The term “taxable carbon
substances” has the same definition as “taxable fuels.” The tax starts at
$15 per ton of CO2 content of the taxable carbon substance, increasing
each year by $10.97 Under AESTFA, EPA is required to set CO2
emissions targets, which are to be designed so that, by 2050, carbon
emissions are reduced to 20% of 2005 levels.98 If the emissions targets
are not met for a particular year, the tax will increase by $15 instead of
by $10.99 The tax is to be imposed on the same entities as the Save Our
Climate Act, and like the Save Our Climate Act, AESTFA provides
certain tax credits and exemptions. This includes a tax credit for
“qualified offset projects.”100 AESTFA defines “qualified offset projects” to
mean projects carried out in the United States that: (1) reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, (2) sequester greenhouse gases, or (3) destroy HFCs.101
AESTFA does not set forth a separate enforcement scheme.
C. Regulating Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act
Aside from a new legislative framework, traditional regulation under
the CAA may also be used to control greenhouse gases. Indeed, as a
result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,102 EPA
was required to make a determination whether to regulate greenhouse
gases under the CAA. In responding to this decision, EPA determined
that greenhouse gases endanger public health and the environment and
that emissions of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles endanger
public health and welfare under CAA Section 202(a).103 On April 1, 2010,
EPA finalized the first greenhouse gas emission standards for motor
vehicles under the CAA.104
Recognizing that EPA has begun to regulate mobile sources of
greenhouse gases under the CAA, this Article focuses on four provisions
of the CAA that EP A could use, or could be compelled to use, to

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. While AESTFA does not explicitly provide that offset projects are entitled
to a tax credit, offset projects are included in the “Refunds or Credits” section of the bill.
101. Id.
102. M assachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007).
103. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Section 202(a) of the Clean
Air Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 66, 496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
104. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (M ay 7, 2010).
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undertake comprehensive regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from
stationary sources.105 We review each of these provisions below.
1. Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permits
The PSD permit provision of CAA Section 165 is the most likely
CAA provision to be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
stationary sources. In fact, because EPA has begun to regulate greenhouse
gases from motor vehicles under Section 202, it is now required to
regulate those same pollutants under the PSD program for “major
stationary sources.”106 Major stationary sources are defined as those
sources that emit more than 100 tons per year of any regulated pollutant
or 250 tons per year of any combination of regulated pollutants.107
The permits for sources exceeding these thresholds must contain
emission limitations that meet best available control technology (“BACT”)
standards.108 Under the P SD program, new major facilities and
modification of existing major facilities require both preconstruction
review and permits.109
Some concerns have been expressed about using the PSD program to
regulate greenhouse gases. The primary concern is that the PSD thresholds,
100 and 250 tons per year, are far too low for greenhouse gases and
would be easily crossed by both major and minor emitters.110 For
example, previously unregulated sources such as “large office and
residential buildings, hotels, [and] large retail establishments” would
likely be subjected to PSD permit requirements if thresholds were left
unaltered.111 As such, the national administration of PSD permits would
jump from between 200 and 300 per year into the thousands.112 Such an
105. For a general discussion of regulating greenhouse gases under the CAA, see
the Bush A dminis tration’s A dvanced N ot ice of P rop os ed Rulemaking “Regulating
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act,” 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2010). The PSD program applies to pollutants regulated
under any Clean Air Act authority, except sections 112 and 211(o).
107. Id. § 7479.
108. Id. § 7475.
109. Id.
110. See Brigham Daniels, Hannah Polikov, Timothy Profeta & James Salzman,
Regulating Climate: What Role for the Clean Air Act?, 39 ENVTL . L. REP . 10,837, 10,840
(2009) [hereinafter Regulating Climate].
111. Id. at 10,840 n.31.
112. EPA, Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR),
P ow erP oint P resentation, 51 (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/pdfs/2008
_09_GHGfull.pdf.
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increase would likely create significant economic and logistical problems
for those state environmental authorities responsible for imposing BACT
standards on emitters.
In response to these concerns, a number of potential solutions have
been suggested. EPA has tried to make clear that it will not immediately
regulate stationary sources, and has published a revised timetable for
industry compliance with greenhouse gas regulations.113 This timetable
indicates that, during the first half of the 2011 calendar year, large
stationary sources that are already regulated under the CAA for nongreenhouse gas emissions must address greenhouse gases in their permit
applications.114 Other large stationary sources will not have to address
greenhouse gas emissions until the latter half of 2011.115 In addition,
using the “Tailoring Rule,” EPA has declared that the PSD threshold
will not be 100 or 250 tons per year, but instead 75,000 to 100,000
tons of total greenhouse gases per year.116 It is important to note,
however, that P SD regulation of greenhouse gases has aroused
significant political opposition. It remains to be seen whether EPA’s
attempts to tailor the PSD requirements to greenhouse gases will survive
judicial and congressional scrutiny and whether EPA’s PSD authority
over greenhouse gases will remain intact.
2. New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)
Another provision that may be used to regulate greenhouse gases
under the CAA is the Section 111 NSPS program. Under Section 111,
EPA may divide stationary sources into a variety of categories, called
source categories. EPA can compel sources in each category to adopt
certain technologies or to reduce emissions levels “to the functional
equivalent of installing such a technology.”117 Such limitations are based

113. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010). See
also Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Administrator, to Senator Jay D. Rockefeller, Senator
from West Virginia (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://epa.gov/oar/pdfs/LPJ_letter.pdf;
Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Administrator, to Senator Lisa M urkowski, Senator from
Alaska (M ar. 26, 2010), available at http://energytopic.nationaljournal.com/100326_jackson
_to_murkowski.pdf.
114. Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, at 17,007 (Apr. 2, 2010).
115. Id.
116. The legal foundation for the agency’s revision of the statutory threshold has,
however, raised significant questions. See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration
and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, at 31,533–49 (June 3,
2010).
117. Regulating Climate, supra note 110, at 10,839.
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on best-demonstrated technology.118 EPA can also regulate existing
sources by requiring states to evaluate their existing sources and submit
a plan for regulating emitted pollutants.119 Regulation of existing sources
is, however, restricted to those pollutants that are not already regulated
by the NAAQS or NESHAP programs such as greenhouse gases.120
The NSPS program is one of the preferred methods for regulating
greenhouse gases under the CAA because it gives EPA a great deal
of flexibility in defining source categories and in determining how each
source category should be treated.121 The program gives the agency
discretion to determine which sectors are regulatory priorities and how
stringently each source category should be regulated.122 The agency may
amend its source categories, thereby allowing it to distinguish between
subsectors of a larger category or combine two similar sectors into one
overarching category as a means of addressing both sources in a timely
and cost-effective manner.123 This enables EPA to tailor its regulations
to particular sectors of the economy, which in turn ensures that specific
technological, economic, and environmental considerations are taken
into account. One further benefit of the NSPS program is the flexibility
it affords EPA in terms of ratcheting up the stringency of previously
issued regulations.124
While there are many characteristics of the NSPS program to
recommend its use for the regulation of greenhouse gases, a shortcoming
of this approach is the length of time it takes for regulations to be
promulgated and implemented. On average, it takes EPA between 18
months and two years to establish NSPS emission guidelines, and
another one or two years before state-adopted standards are promulgated.125

118. Franz T. Litz & Nicholas M . Bianco, What to Expect From EPA: Regulation of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL . L. REP . (ENVTL . LAW INST.)
10,460, at 10,482 (2010) [hereinafter What to Expect].
119. Id.
120. Id. The NAAQS and NESHAP programs are discussed in more detail below.
121. See EPA, T E C H NI CA L SU P P OR T D OC UM E NT F O R TH E A D VANC ED N OTI C E OF
PROP OSED RULEMAKING FOR GREENHOUSE GASES; STATIONARY SOURCES, for a general
discussion of how NSPS requirements might apply to greenhouse gas sources, available
at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emis sions/downloads /ANPRPreamble.pdf; see
also Regulating Climate, supra note 110, at 10,839.
122. Id.
123. What to Expect, supra note 118, at 10,482.
124. Regulating Climate, supra note 110, at 10,839.
125. What to Expect, supra note 118, at 10,483.
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Past experience has shown that most states allow emitters three years to
come into compliance.126
Due to the vast array of greenhouse gas emitting sources, it may take
EPA a significant amount of time to methodically develop regulations
for each of its source categories.127 Some categories will face regulation
long before others.128 The unique nature of greenhouse gases—most of
which result from the combustion of fuels—may, however, simplify
implementation to some degree. The NSPS may be based on changing
the type of fuel burned or by imposing energy efficiency standards. As
such, NSPS for greenhouse gases may not be as cumbersome as
traditional NSPS promulgation.
An intriguing possibility is that EPA could establish a cap-and-trade
program using CAA Section 111. Indeed, there is some precedent for this:
in 2005, EPA established a mercury trading program under Section 111.
Although the program was struck down by the D.C. Circuit, the court’s
decision was not based on grounds that called into question the
permissibility of establishing trading under Section 111.129 Nevertheless,
even if EPA were able to use NSPS to establish a greenhouse gas capand-trade system, such a system could have several significant limitations.
This includes an inability to allow trading between source categories and
an inability to allow the use of offsets.130 Also, the time required to
implement the program is an issue. While EPA started working on the
mercury trading program in 2001, it has yet to implement the program,
and even if EPA remains committed to the program, it appears that it
could take several more years to implement.
3. National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
A third provision that may be used to regulate greenhouse gases under
the CAA is the NAAQS program (CAA Sections 108-110). Under this
program, EPA has the authority to identify criteria air pollutants and set
limitations on the concentration of each pollutant in the ambient air.131
The program was implemented in order to regulate air pollutants such as
smog, whose concentrations were locally significant. As a result, the
NAAQS program requires the ambient air quality in small geographic
126. Id.
127. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354, at 44,368 (July 30, 2008).
128. Id.
129. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Instead, the court ruled
that EPA impermissibly removed mercury from regulation as a hazardous air pollutant
under Section 112.
130. What to Expect, supra note 118, at 10,482.
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–11 (2008).
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areas within each state to be measured. Air quality is improved through
the execution of state implementation plans (“SIPs”).
While the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is possible under the
NAAQS program, such a regulatory scheme would have significant
drawbacks.132 In contrast to the local pollutants that are typically regulated
under the program, greenhouse gases are spread uniformly throughout
the earth’s atmosphere. 133 States would therefore find it next to
impossible to reduce greenhouse gases within their airshed by merely
employing a SIP.134 Also, if EPA did regulate greenhouse gases under
the NAAQS program, it would not be able to regulate existing greenhouse
gas sources under the NSPS program, which would strip that program of
much of its utility as a greenhouse gas regulatory option.135 Although
some commentators have proposed interesting methods for using
NAAQS and SIPs to tackle climate change,136 the tools and nature of the
program make it unlikely to be used by EPA to control greenhouse gas
emissions.137

132. See generally Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act,
73 Fed. Reg. at 44,367–68.
133. What to Expect, supra note 118, at 10,838.
134. Id.
135. Regulating Greenhouse Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354,
at 44,485 (proposed July 30, 2008).
136. See, e.g., Thomas D. Peterson, Robert B. M cKinstry, Jr. & John C. Dernbach,
Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Mitigation Policy in the United
States: Integrating Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 39 ENVTL . L. REP .
(ENVTL . LAW INST.) 10,711, at 10,733–34 (Aug. 2009). But see, Robert Brenner & Anna
M arie Wood, Comment on Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change
Mitigation Policy in the United States: Integrating Levels of Government and Economic
Sectors, 39 ENVTL . L. REP . (ENVTL . LAW INST.) 10,723 (Aug. 2009); M ichael Gerrard,
Comment on Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Mitigation Policy in
the United States: Integrating Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 39 ENVTL . L.
REP . (E N VTL . L A W I N ST .) 10,727 (A ug. 2009); G ary G uzy, Comment on Developing
a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Mitigation Policy in the United States:
Integrating Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 39 ENVTL . L. REP . (ENVTL . LAW
INST.) 10,730 (Aug. 2009); Raymond B. Ludwiszewski & Charles H. Haake, Comment on
Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change Mitigation Policy in the United
States: Integrating Levels of Government and Economic Sectors, 39 ENVTL . L. REP . (ENVTL .
LAW INST.) 10,732 (Aug. 2009).
137. See Robin Bravender, Groups Back Petition to Spur National CO2 Standard,
GREENWIRE , Dec. 21, 2009 (quoting EPA Administrator Jackson as saying she and EPA have
“never believed that getting a national ambient air quality standard for greenhouse gases
was advisable”).
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It is nonetheless conceivable that EPA could be compelled to use the
NAAQS program through a combination of petitions and lawsuits from
third parties. In fact, several environmental groups have petitioned EPA
to take this approach.138 And, EPA was compelled to regulate lead under
the NAAQS program despite significant Agency reluctance.139
4. National Emission Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants (NESHAP)
A fourth option for regulating greenhouse gases under the CAA is the
NESHAP program (CAA Section 112). This program enables EPA to
list pollutants that create “a threat of adverse human health effects” or
harmful environmental impacts.140 If EPA lists one or more greenhouse
gas under Section 112, it must also list all categories of major sources.141
Under this provision, major sources are defined as those sources that
emit or may potentially emit 10 tons per year of any one hazardous air
pollutant or 25 tons per year of any combination of hazardous air
pollutants.142 Any pollutants that EPA lists under this program must be
treated by maximum achievable control technology standards.143
Like NAAQS, the NESHAP program is an unlikely regulatory path
for controlling greenhouse gases from stationary sources.144 This is
because “[S]ection 112 ‘appears to allow EPA little flexibility regarding
either the source categories to be regulated or the size of the sources to
regulate . . . EPA would be required to regulate a very large number of
new and existing stationary sources, including smaller stationary
sources.’”145 In addition, the NESHAP program requires new sources
to come into compliance immediately and existing sources to come into
compliance within three to four years, which leaves little time for
technological innovation.146
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that relying on traditional CAA
regulation is not the ideal option for controlling greenhouse gases. In the
absence of a federal legislative framework, it may, however, be the only
available option.
138. Id.
139. Nat’l Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1976).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2).
141. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, supra note 135, at
44,368.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b).
143. Id.
144. See generally Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act,
supra note 135.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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II. COM PARING ENFORCEM ENT ASPECTS OF CONTROL OPTIONS
Given the numerous options for regulating greenhouse gases, it is
important to assess each of these options. The most important criterion
in this assessment is environmental effectiveness—whether the option
results in the desired emissions reductions. Other factors are important
as well, such as the efficiency of the option and its likely durability in
the face of changing circumstances. As summarized in Table 1, in this
section we compare several aspects of enforcement that will impact the
effectiveness of the various greenhouse gas control options. This
comparison suggests that, while many proposed programs have the main
elements in place to be effectively enforced, all have some weaknesses that
may hinder their ultimate environmental effectiveness.
TABLE 1. SUM M ARY OF ENFORCEM ENT P ROVISIONS OF GREENHOUSE
GAS CONTROL P ROGRAM S

* Monitoring, reporting and verification.
** A theoretical CAA Section 111 cap-and-trade system created by EPA
using its final rule for Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases as a
model of the monitoring, reporting and verification requirements.

A. Regulatory Complexity
The various greenhouse gas control options differ in their regulatory
complexity. Among the options, Waxman-Markey, which splits regulatory
authority among four federal agencies, creates several new administrative
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bodies and calls for 145 new rulemakings, is the most complex. This
will likely give rise to some enforcement challenges. While KerryLieberman has a similar regulatory structure to Waxman-Markey, it
takes a different approach to certain key issues, rendering it more
manageable. Compared to Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman,
Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals offer less complexity, but
this comes at the cost of reduced flexibility for regulated entities in
meeting their compliance obligations. At the same time, it is not yet clear
how complex regulation will be under the CAA, as this will depend in
large part on how EPA decides to implement a greenhouse gas program
under the statute.
Regulatory complexity is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a
highly complex program may result in a more efficient system. For
example, by creating an almost economy-wide approach to greenhouse
gas controls, a highly complex cap-and-trade program may allow trading
across sectors and offsets to be used, thus decreasing implementation
costs for the regulated community. At the same time, such complexity
gives rise to numerous implementation and enforcement problems.
Program design must, therefore, strike a balance between complexity,
flexibility, and ability to implement. In considering regulatory complexity,
we evaluate two different elements: (1) agency expertise and coordination;
and (2) the amount of time and resources needed to implement the
program.
1. Agency Expertise and Coordination
The expertise of the agency selected to implement a greenhouse gas
program will affect the enforcement and effectiveness of that program.
A review of the various greenhouse gas control options reveals that
some questionable decisions have been made in regards to which agency
will implement them. Among the various options, Waxman-Markey is
the most problematic. The bill bears the scars of its passage in the House
of Representatives: in order to mollify certain concerns over committee
jurisdiction and EPA control over agricultural interests, the bill’s sponsors
gave significant roles to USDA and FERC. As a result, Waxman-Markey
splits authority to oversee the greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program
among four federal agencies: EPA, USDA, FERC and CFTC. Each
agency is charged with regulating a different aspect of the program. The
EPA is in charge of distributing emission allowances and managing the
offsets program, except that the portion of the offsets program relating to
domestic agricultural and forestry sources is to be managed by USDA.
At the same time, regulation of the emission allowance and offset credit
market is to be overseen by two other federal agencies, FERC and CFTC.
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The role assigned to FERC is highly problematic. At present, FERC is
responsible for regulating the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil,
and electricity, as well as regulating natural gas and hydroelectric
projects.147 This is a stark contrast to the role that FERC would be
playing under Waxman-Markey, where it will be required to regulate the
greenhouse gas allowance market—a commodity market among industries
that span the U.S. economy. While the energy industry is likely to be
highly involved in the market, many participants will not be in this
industry. Thus, there is no clear fit between FERC’s expertise and its
oversight of a national greenhouse gas market. Indeed, the Chairman of
FERC has himself publicly questioned whether his agency is well-suited
to regulating this market.148
In addition, the prominent role given to USDA in implementing the
agricultural and forestry offset program under Waxman-Markey is
highly problematic.149 USDA has traditionally viewed farmers as its
“constituents,”150 and has stated that part of its mission is to promote the
economic well-being of farmers and expand their markets.151 The vision
of USDA is “to be recognized as a dynamic organization that is able to
efficiently provide the integrated program delivery needed to lead a
rapidly evolving food and agriculture system.”152 Under WaxmanMarkey, USDA is in charge of determining the environmental sufficiency
of agricultural and forestry offsets. Query whether an agency focused on
supporting and promoting the American farmer would have the motivation
and expertise to design, implement and enforce an environmentally
rigorous offset system that promised to lavish billions of dollars on its
“constituents.” While it is true that USDA has more expertise in farming

147. FERC, About FERC—What FERC Does, http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.
asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
148. Peter Behr, FERC: An Energy Overseer May Have the Clout to Umpire Emissions
Trading, CLIMATE WIRE , Apr. 2, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2009/04/02/
archive/8.
149. Christa M arshall, Offsets: New Ag Language in Climate Bill Riles Enviro Groups,
CLIMATE WIRE , June 26, 2009, http://www.pacificforest.org/news/Media%20Clips%20PDF/
Climatewire-ACES-6-26-09.pdf; Allison Winter, Farm Groups Prevail as House Bill Puts
USDA in Charge of Ag Offsets, N.Y. T IMES, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/cwire/2009/06/24/24climatewire-farm-groups-p revail-as -hous e-climate-bill-p u24287.ht ml.
150. See generally USDA, www.usda.gov (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
151. See USDA M ission Statement, http://www.usda.gov/wps/p ort al/usda/usdahome
(last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
152. Id.
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than EPA, USDA does not have a solid track record of determining the
sufficiency of environmental programs, which EPA does. There is a
significant risk that the integrity of the U.S. offset system could be called
into question should EPA and USDA take significantly different approaches
to creating offsets or should one agency be viewed as inadequately
ensuring the environmental integrity of offsets.
Although Kerry-Lieberman takes a largely similar approach to agency
authority as Waxman-Markey, there are certain differences between the
two bills that may offer some solutions for the split in authority among
agencies. To start, Kerry-Lieberman does not give FERC any authority
to oversee the greenhouse gas market, but places oversight of the market
solely into the hands of the agency expert in market regulation: CFTC.153
This will likely improve implementation and enforcement of the
program. At the same time, Kerry-Lieberman takes a somewhat different
approach to the split authority under the domestic offsets program.
While EPA and USDA are still responsible for different aspects of the
program, the two agencies are required to jointly establish the program.154
This includes jointly selecting an advisory committee to provide scientific
and technical advice regarding the domestic offsets program, as well as
jointly promulgating regulations to implement the program.155 This
approach could go a long way in ameliorating concerns about two separate
sets of regulations. It does, however, leave some room for concern
because enforcement will still be left in the hands of each agency. As a
result, it is still possible that one agency could demand strict compliance
with the regulations while the other took a more permissive approach.
The other greenhouse control options also make some questionable
decisions in regards to implementing agencies. Cantwell-Collins gives
oversight of its greenhouse gas program to Treasury. While it makes
some sense to draw on Treasury’s expertise in collecting taxes and
regulating financial markets and instruments, Treasury has no prior
experience with implementing pollution control programs. It is troublesome
that Treasury will need to evaluate the environmental effectiveness of
carbon capture and storage, reinjection facilities, and carbon embedded
in manufactured products, as well as investigate and account for leakage,
verify additionality, and make other technical decisions about the offset
program. This is also true of the carbon tax proposals, which give the
IRS—a bureau of Treasury—authority over their greenhouse gas programs.
While the IRS is a logical choice to collect taxes, query whether the

153.
154.
155.
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Id. § 733(a)(1)(A).
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agency will be able to oversee the environmental effectiveness of the
offsets envisioned under AESTFA.
In addition to agency expertise, agency coordination is an important
aspect of enforcement. Coordination is required to ensure that each
agency receives the information that it needs to carry out its responsibilities.
This is likely to be an issue under Waxman-Markey. Although each of
the four implementing agencies is given a distinct role in regulating the
greenhouse gas program, the agencies will likely need to establish
information-sharing protocols and enter into memoranda of understanding
in order to properly coordinate their roles. For instance, FERC and
CFTC will need information from EPA regarding distribution of emission
allowances, as well as certification of offset credits in order to properly
regulate the emission allowance and offset credit market. At the same
time, coordination is needed to ensure that the program is consistently
administered. Waxman-Markey requires each agency to promulgate its
own regulations. Although the bill sets forth general requirements for
these regulations, the details are largely left to each agency’s discretion.
This may lead to regulations being inconsistently promulgated and
enforced.156
Kerry-Lieberman addresses some of these issues by explicitly requiring
the implementing agencies to coordinate their activities. Specifically, the
bill requires various federal agencies, including EPA, USDA and CFTC,
to enter into a memorandum of understanding within one year after
Kerry-Lieberman is enacted in order to establish procedures to, among
other things, “share information that may be requested for enforcement,
surveillance, or such other purposes within the scope of the jurisdiction
of the requesting agency.”157 Although the agencies will still need to
work out the details of any information sharing, requiring the agencies to
complete this work by a date certain will likely facilitate coordination
among the various agencies and, in turn, simplify enforcement.

156. Waxman-M arkey does attempt to provide some coordination among the agencies.
For example, under Section 531 of the bill, the advisory committee for USDA offsets
program is required to “coordinate its activities with those of any other [f]ederal advisory
committees working in related areas” and to “consult with, and be informed by the views
of” the advisory committee for EPA offsets program. These provisions presumably provide
an opportunity for USDA to coordinate some of its offset program activities with those
of EPA, but the details have been left to the agencies to determine. These details will need to
be worked out and put in place in order to ensure proper coordination and, in turn, proper
enforcement of the cap-and-trade program.
157. Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2415.
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Cantwell-Collins further simplifies enforcement of a greenhouse gas
control program by placing its administration largely into the hands of
one agency. As noted above, the Secretary is in charge of establishing a
program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.158 The Secretary is also
required to, among other things, conduct periodic auctions of the
allowances,159 distribute allowances for certain offset activities,160 and—
in consultation with CFTC, FERC and the FTC—promulgate regulations
to establish, operate, and oversee any derivatives markets.161 The advantage
of this approach is that, unlike Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman,
it does not split administration of the program among several agencies. It
is therefore less likely that there will be issues of coordination or
inconsistency in promulgating and enforcing regulations—issues that are
likely to arise under Waxman-Markey and, to a lesser extent, KerryLieberman.
Similar to Cantwell-Collins, the carbon tax proposals and regulation
under the CAA also rely on one implementing agency. This will
decrease coordination issues significantly. Compared to a carbon tax,
however, traditional CAA authority is more complex, because state
agencies are involved in implementing and enforcing these programs.
Because states must align their programs with any changes made at the
federal level, there is often a significant time delay in translating federal
mandates into on-the-ground requirements.162 Further, there may be
disputes between EPA and states over regulatory interpretation, stringency
of standards and enforcement matters.163
2. Amount of Time and Resources to Implement
The amount of time and resources needed to implement a greenhouse
gas control program affects the enforcement and effectiveness of that
program. Indeed, the more time and resources needed to create the
program, the more opportunity there will be for disruptions in the
implementation process from such factors as litigation and lack of

158. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33, § 4(a)(1).
159. Id. § 4(b)(1).
160. Id. § 4(c).
161. Id. § 4(b)(8)(B).
162. See, e.g., Robin Bravender, EPA Tailoring Rule Creates Challenge for State
Regulations, GREENWIRE , June 2, 2010 (some states likely unable to modify regulations
to comply with EPA GHG rule within one year).
163. For example, EPA has had an ongoing dispute with Texas over the stringency
of its air permitting program. See Naureen S. M alik, EPA Rejects Texas Flexible Air-Quality
Permit Authority, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703426004575339140408652292.html.
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sufficient resources. In considering this aspect, there is a stark difference
among the various greenhouse gas control options.
To start, Waxman-Markey is likely to require the most amount of time
and resources to implement. The bill is by far the most complex and
detailed of the pending legislative proposals.164 To implement its
greenhouse gas reduction provisions, EPA alone would need to undertake
at least 33 rulemakings.165 EPA rulemakings often take several years to
be worked into final rules, which then face several additional years of
court challenges. And, once all judicial review is complete, it will take
many years to actually implement these provisions. This regulatory
structure, which is largely the same for Kerry-Lieberman, is likely to lead
to significant implementation challenges.
In contrast to Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, Cantwell-Collins
offers a more simple approach. It avoids many of the most controversial
and complex aspects of the other cap-and-trade bills by limiting the
number of sources regulated and focusing on just carbon, not several
greenhouse gases. In addition, it has a more streamlined regulatory
approach, including limited opportunities to utilize offsets. Still,
Cantwell-Collins requires a new regulatory structure within Treasury.
This will take time and will likely face litigation challenges. Accordingly,
while Cantwell-Collins’ regulatory structure is likely to lead to less
implementation challenges than Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman,
it does not eliminate all of them.
The carbon tax proposals will likely require the least amount of time
and resources to implement. Unlike the cap-and-trade approaches,
implementation of a carbon tax will not require new regulatory structures.
For example, many of the entities that would be covered under an
upstream tax like that proposed in the Save Our Climate Act and
AESTFA are already subject to excise taxes.166 The same structures that
are used for collecting excise taxes could also be used for collecting

164. See M ichael Gerrard, Refining the Challenge in Implementing Carbon Policy,
40 ENVTL . L. REP . (ENVTL . LAW INST.) 10,579, at 10,581 (2010).
165. Id. at 10,582.
166. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE , POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS
xiii (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8934/02-12-Carbon.pdf.
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carbon taxes.167 Utilizing existing structures would simplify implementation
and enforcement.168
The one exception is that AESTFA allows a refund or credit for
“qualified offset projects.” The bill does not, however, set forth any
requirements related to those projects. In fact, other than defining what
a “qualified offset project” is, the only other guidance that AESTFA
provides with respect to such projects is that the Secretary must, in
consultation with the Secretary of Energy, “conduct a study and submit a
report to Congress of qualified offset projects” within one year after
AESTFA is enacted.169 The details of any such program are left to
Treasury to determine. Thus, instead of regulatory complexity, AESTFA
has so few details as to leave regulators with seemingly unfettered
discretion, which is a concern in itself.
The amount of time and resources required to implement greenhouse
gas controls under the CAA will be significant, although this will depend
heavily on how EPA chooses to implement such a program. Even
though there is an existing regulatory system in place for permitting and
enforcement, if the existing PSD program were to come into force for
greenhouse gases without the Tailoring Rule taking effect, tens of
thousands of additional sources would be subject to regulation by
EP A and the states. Attempting to create BACT for such a large
number of sources could be a significant resource drain, would be
extremely time intensive, would greatly burden state agencies, and may
not be effective at reducing emissions.170 Many states have noted that
even with the Tailoring Rule, application of PSD requirements to
sources that emit more than 75,000 tons of greenhouse gases per year
will require a significant investment of time and resources.171
Overall, none of the greenhouse gas control options present a simple
approach. Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman will require a herculean
effort by all of the federal and state agencies involved in implementing
and overseeing the program, which will likely translate into significant
time delays. In an era of extreme budget deficits and a widely embraced
desire to reduce federal spending, it is unclear whether the political will
167. Id.; see also Carbon T ax Cent er, Introduction, http://www.carbontax.org/
introduction (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
168. Roberta F. M ann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics and
Find Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL . L. REP . (ENVTL . LAW INST.) 10,118, at 10,120 (2009).
169. AESTFA, supra note 88, § 4692(b).
170. There are, however, tools that may cushion or avoid some of these concerns. EPA
could put limits on, or issue new interpretations of, sources’ “potential to emit” or streamline
the permitting of traditionally minor sources by issuing general permits. EPA, supra note 112.
171. See EPA, State and Local Permitting Authority Responses to Tailoring Rule
Request (60-day Letters), http://www.epa.gov/N SR/2010letters .ht ml (last visited Oct.
5, 2010).
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exists to undertake such a substantial governmental effort. Even if the
costs of the programs are funded by proceeds from the auction of emission
credits, creation of what can be seen as a large bureaucracy to implement
these programs comes at a time when the public is increasingly unwilling to
subsidize government programs. Ironically, the long-heralded “market
mechanism” of cap-and-trade may itself be too weighty a regulatory
program to take flight in this political atmosphere. At the same time,
more streamlined approaches like a carbon tax face tremendous political
hurdles because of opposition to taxes, and will not bring the lower costs
to regulated entities promised by the investment in regulatory complexity.
And relying on traditional CAA authority brings the potential for
significant complexity, litigation delay, and higher costs to the regulated
community as well.
B. Number and Variety of Sources
While there is no simple relationship between enforcement and the
number and variety of sources regulated, experience with previous capand-trade programs suggests that subjecting increased numbers and
types of sources to regulation will impede enforcement. Taking this into
account, it appears that, among the various options, Waxman-Markey,
Kerry-Lieberman, and traditional CAA regulation will face the most
significant enforcement challenges. In contrast, Cantwell-Collins and the
carbon tax proposals will likely face less enforcement challenges since
they cover not only a smaller number, but also a smaller variety of
sources.
The number and variety of sources regulated under the various
greenhouse gas control programs will affect how effectively these
programs can be in enforced. In general, the costs and complexity of
administering a greenhouse gas control program increase as the number
and variety of regulated sources increase.172 This in turn may increase
the potential for non-compliance. It should be noted, however, that in
certain circumstances an increased number and variety of sources may
facilitate compliance among regulated entities. For example, adding

172. See generally CONG . BUDGET OFFICE , AN EVALUATION OF CAP -AND -T RADE
PROGRAMS FOR REDUCING U.S. CARBON EMISSIONS viii–ix (2001), available at http://www.
cbo.gov/ftpdocs/28xx/doc2876/CapTrade.pdf (analyzing four proposed plans based on
their ease of imp lementation, carbon-target certainty, increment al-cost certainty, cost
effectiveness, and distributional effects).
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more sources that are authorized to trade in a greenhouse gas market will
likely increase flexibility, allow lower-cost sources to trade, and generally
decrease the overall cost of greenhouse gas emission credits. Expanding
the pool of regulated entities also allows industries to share the regulatory
burden, as some industries will experience technological breakthroughs
earlier than others. By helping to create a lower cost to comply, this
may ease the enforcement burden on agencies and regulated entities,
resulting in greater environmental effectiveness.
Experience with previous cap-and-trade programs nevertheless suggests
that—overall—a larger number and variety of sources can impede
enforcement. Indeed, the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
(“RECLAIM”) program illustrates this. RECLAIM is a regional capand-trade program that was adopted by the South Coast Air Quality
Management District in 1993 in order to reduce SOx and NOx emissions
from certain stationary sources in the South Coast Air Basin.173 The
sources regulated under RECLAIM are “more heterogeneous than those
of the Acid Rain Program, including not only power plants, but also
refineries, asphalt, and cement producers.”174 As noted by McAllister, the
heterogeneity of sources regulated under RECLAIM has led to some
difficulty in tracking emissions. In fact, “[b]ecause RECLAIM included
many different types and sizes of industries, the data required to be
submitted by [regulated entities] varied widely. Efforts to automate data
submission and verification were hindered by the lack of uniformity.”175
The heterogeneity of sources has therefore resulted in some enforcement
issues.
Experience under the Acid Rain Program also suggests that large
numbers and variety of sources will impede enforcement. EPA’s
experience with the program suggests that it takes a deep understanding
of the regulated sources, large investments of time and staff to work with
regulated sources, and detailed explanations of the program requirements to
achieve high levels of compliance:
The high levels of data quality and source compliance were not attained from the
outset of the programs. Rather, they were achieved through several years of
careful program implementation, working closely and cooperatively with the regulated
community. The authors believe that in order for a cap-and-trade program to
succeed, it is essential that the monitoring, reporting, and verification [MRV] quality

173. EPA, EPA’S EVALUATION OF THE RECLAIM PROGRAM IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR
QUALITY M ANAGEMENT DISTRICT, available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/reclaim/
index.html. See also Beyond Playing Banker, supra note 14, at 287–88.
174. Beyond Playing Banker, supra note 14, at 288.
175. Id. at 298, 301.
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assurance/quality control elements of the program be based on principles that
foster the development and maintenance of a strong program.176

Based on this, it seems that increasing the number and variety of sources
in a cap-and-trade program will make it more difficult to enforce the
program.177
Taking into account the number and variety of sources regulated under
the various greenhouse gas control options, it is likely that enforcement
will be simpler under certain of the options than others. It is estimated
that about 7,500 entities will be regulated under Waxman-Markey and
Kerry-Lieberman.178 Such sources include a variety of upstream and
downstream sources of greenhouse gases, including electricity sources,
greenhouse gas importers, and various types of stationary sources.179 In
contrast to Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, Cantwell-Collins
and the carbon tax proposals would regulate only upstream sources of
greenhouse gases. This would reduce the number of regulated entities
from 7,500 to approximately 2,000 sources, which is comparable to the
number of entities that are currently regulated under the Acid Rain
Program.180 In addition, the entities that would be regulated under an
upstream approach are more homogeneous than those that would be
regulated under Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman. It is therefore
likely that enforcement, including the ability to determine compliance,
would be much more straightforward under Cantwell-Collins and the
carbon tax proposals.

176. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1577.
177. Even if the number and variety of sources can be managed by regulators, it will
take a significant and long-term commitment of resources from all levels of government
to achieve the same degree of attention, and therefore levels of compliance, from the regulated
community as under the Acid Rain Program. It remains to be seen, however, whether
Congress, future administrations, and the states will be willing to provide implementing
agencies with the necessary resources to meet the program’s needs. This poses a significant
risk to the effective implementation and enforcement of the program. See generally id.
(discussing the EPA’s implementation of the Acid Rain Program and NOx Budget Trading
Programs using several fundamental monitoring, reporting, and verification elements).
178. SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN POWER ACT 5 (2010), available at http://kerry.
s enat e.gov/imo/media/doc/A P A Short Summary 1.pdf; see also M ARK HOLT ET AL .,
GREENHOUSE GAS LEGISLATION : SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2454 AS PASSED BY
THE H OUSE OF REP RESENTATIVES 84 (Congressional Research Service 2009).
179. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 700(13); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32,
§ 700(12).
180. See EPA, CLEAN AIR MARKETS: ACID RAIN PROGRAM (2010), http://www.epa.gov/
airmarkt/progsregs/arp/basic.html.
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It is difficult to predict the number of sources that might be regulated
under traditional CAA authority. A CAA Section 111 trading program
would likely result in roughly the same number and variety of sources as
under Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman. As such, it would likely
need significant resources to be administered effectively. Imposition of
the PSD program in its current form—without the narrowing effect of
the Tailoring Rule—could result in tens of thousands of sources being
regulated under the program. This could pose significant administrative,
enforcement and compliance difficulties for EPA, the states and the
regulated community.
Taken together, the relationship between the number and variety of
sources and enforcement is not straightforward. Although adding sources
to a cap-and-trade program may increase flexibility and ultimately improve
compliance, experience with RECLAIM and the Acid Rain Program
suggests that implementing Waxman-Markey, Kerry-Lieberman or any of
the traditional CAA approaches will take a significant, long-term
investment of resources and political will to have a chance at success.
The charm of Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals is their
more narrow focus, but they come at a higher cost to the regulated
community.
C. Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
The various greenhouse gas control options take different approaches
to monitoring, reporting and verification. Waxman-Markey, KerryLieberman, and the traditional CAA programs all have detailed monitoring,
reporting, and verification requirements that will likely support their
successful implementation. In contrast, Cantwell-Collins and the carbon
tax proposals fail to specify any of these requirements. This gives rise to
some significant concerns about whether these programs’ ultimate
monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements will be sufficient.
Monitoring, reporting and verification are key components of an
effective enforcement system.181 Without these components, regulated
entities would have little incentive to comply with emission targets,
making it unlikely that environmental objectives would be met. These
components also facilitate transparency, citizen confidence and citizen
enforcement, while building trust in the veracity of the program. Indeed,
181. See, e.g., JAY SHIMSHACK , M ONITORING , ENFORCEMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
COMP LIANCE : UNDERSTANDING SP ECIFIC AND GENERAL DETERRENCE (2007) available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/compliance/research/meec-whitepaper.pdf
[hereinafter U nderstanding D eterr ence]; Fundamentals, s upr a not e 8, at 1578
(“ K ey comp onent s of a strong enforcement program include record keeping, reporting,
and penalties.”).
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as demonstrated by the Toxics Release Inventory (“TRI”), making
information on environmental releases publicly available can effectively
encourage emissions reductions independently of regulation.182 This
occurs not only through increased community pressure, but also through
increased awareness within the source’s management about emissions.183
The degree to which the TRI experience can be replicated with greenhouse
gases remains to be seen, however, given that greenhouse gases pose a
global, not local, risk and may not attract the same level of scrutiny as
traditional pollutants.
As can be seen from Table 2, both Waxman-Markey and KerryLieberman take a similar approach to monitoring, reporting and verification
of greenhouse gas emissions. Under this approach, EPA must issue
regulations that require regulated entities to submit data to EPA “sufficient
to ensure compliance with or implementation of the requirements” of the
bill.184 This includes data on greenhouse gas emissions; the production
and importation of fuels and gases that may result in greenhouse gas
emissions; and the capture and sequestration of greenhouse gases.185
These data must be based on a continuous monitoring system, such as
CEMS, or on an alternative system or methodology that is shown to
provide data with the same precision and reliability as a continuous
monitoring system.186

182. See generally LINDA K. BREGGIN AND READ D. PORTER, AP P LICABILITY OF THE
T O XI C S R E LE AS E I N VENTO R Y TO N A NOM ATE R IAL S 4 (2008) (finding general, but
not unanimous, agreement that TRI has been a success).
183. See Archon Fung & Dara O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation
from the Grassroots Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release
Inventory, 25 ENVTL . M GMT. 115 (2000).
184. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 700(b)(1)(B); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note
32, § 700(b)(1)(B).
185. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 700(b)(1)(A); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note
32, § 700(b)(1)(A).
186. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 700(b)(1)(G); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note
32, § 700(b)(1)(G).
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TABLE 2. COM PARISON OF DATA MONITORING, REPORTING AND
VERIFICATION REQUIREM ENTS

*
**

FERC applies for Waxman-Markey only.
No domestic offset verification reports are available to the public
under Kerry-Lieberman. Agriculture and forestry offset verification
reports are unavailable to the public under Waxman-Markey.
*** A theoretical CAA Section 111 cap-and-trade system created by EPA
using its final rule for Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases as a
model of the monitoring, reporting and verification requirements.
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Although it is unclear how EPA will implement these requirements,
EPA has published its final rule for Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse
Gases.187 The rule establishes mandatory greenhouse gas reporting
requirements for approximately thirty sources of greenhouse gases,
including owners and operators of facilities that directly emit greenhouse
gases and certain suppliers of fossil fuels and greenhouse gases.188 EPA
anticipates that the rule will apply to about 10,000 facilities that are
responsible for approximately 85% of the total U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions.189 While this rule was developed independently of WaxmanMarkey and Kerry-Lieberman, it provides a good indication of the sort
of regulations that EPA would likely promulgate under a national capand-trade program. This rule suggests that entities that are already required
to collect and report data using CEMS under a separate program will be
required to directly measure their emissions. Other entities will have a
choice of using either CEMS or facility-specific greenhouse gas
calculations set forth in the rule. Calculations used to estimate missing
emissions data also vary by source.190 Although this approach is similar
to the approach taken under the Acid Rain Program, it is important to
keep in mind that the number and variety of sources regulated under
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman will be almost four times greater
than under the Acid Rain Program. As discussed above, this is likely to
make enforcement more complicated.
Unlike Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, Cantwell-Collins does
not explicitly set out any monitoring, reporting, or verification requirements
for greenhouse gas emissions. Under the bill, the Secretary is required to
establish a program within the Treasury to reduce greenhouse gas

187. M andatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260
(proposed Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 CFR Parts 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033,
1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065).
188. Id. at 56,377.
189. Press Release, EPA, EPA Finalizes the Nation’s First Greenhouse Gas Reporting
System/M onit oring t o Begin in 2010 (Sept. 22, 2009) available at http://yosemite.epa.
gov/opa/admp res s .nsf/d985312f6895893b852574ac005f1e40/194e412153fcffea852576
3900530d75!OpenDocument.
190. 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, at 56,280. Under the rule, reporting entities are required to
submit annual reports to EPA that include, among other things, the entities’ annual greenhouse
gas emissions as well as a certification from a designated representative affirming that
the statements and information included in the report are true, accurate and complete. Id.
The rule requires self-certification with EPA emissions verification. Id. at 56,282. Data
submitted under the rule will be made available to the public. Id. at 56,359.
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emissions.191 This program would presumably contain monitoring,
reporting, and verification requirements. It is important to note nonetheless
that, even after monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements are
put in place, Treasury is likely to still need some time, particularly in the
initial stages of the program, to gain experience with administering a
cap-and-trade program.
Nevertheless, monitoring, reporting, and verification are likely to be
less complicated under Cantwell-Collins than under Waxman-Markey
and Kerry-Lieberman: not only are there fewer entities to regulate, but
the 2,000 entities that are to be regulated already monitor and report
fossil fuel sales to the government “for tax and other purposes.”192
Annual reporting requirements are therefore unlikely to impose significant
additional administrative burden. As a result, after Treasury gains
experience in administering the program, monitoring, reporting and
verification are likely to be more straightforward.
At the same time, it should be noted that it is unlikely Treasury will
require the same kind of monitoring, reporting, or verification
traditionally set forth in environmental regulations. This is due in large
part to the nature of the Cantwell-Collins trading program, which trades
on tons of fossil carbon, not greenhouse gas emissions or CO2
equivalence. The regulations promulgated under Cantwell-Collins
will likely use sales data and carbon-content factors to calculate the
amount of carbon shares that a first seller needs to comply. Thus, while
the other bills’ reporting requirements would create an inventory of
greenhouse gas emissions, Cantwell-Collins could create a national map
of carbon input into the economy.193
The carbon tax proposals do not set forth a separate enforcement
scheme, including monitoring, reporting and verification requirements,
and would presumably rely on the enforcement mechanisms of the U.S.
federal income tax system. To a large extent, this system depends on
“voluntarily compliance,” whereby taxpayers are required to independently
assess and report their tax obligations to the IRS.194 The Code provides
a number of “incentives” for taxpayers to comply, most of which involve
punishing noncompliance.195 The IRS also depends on the threat of audit

191. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33, § 4(a)(1).
192. Meaningful, supra note 72, at 313.
193. As discussed in more detail in the next section, this would not replace the need
for a national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions. As also discussed below, it remains
unclear if this information would be available to the public.
194. Leandra Lederman, T he Interplay Between Norm s and Enfor cem ent in
Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1455 (2003) [hereinafter Interplay]. Lederman
points out that, “for many taxpayers, compliance is not truly voluntary.” Id. at 1455 n.6.
195. Id. at 1456.
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to encourage compliance.196 Relying on these enforcement mechanisms
has the benefit of using established regulatory roles and familiar tools.
Fairly minimal monitoring, reporting and verification requirements
would be needed to implement a carbon tax, and would seemingly not
need to be any more complicated than for other excise taxes.197 And, like
the Cantwell-Collins program, the information gathered from a carbon
tax would provide information on the flow of carbon into the economy if
made publicly available.
EPA’s CAA regulations have a highly developed set of enforcement
provisions that rely on extensive monitoring, reporting, recordkeeping,
and inspections. Promulgating monitoring, reporting and verification
requirements for greenhouse gases under the NSPS and PSD programs
would, like a carbon tax, likely follow existing requirements using
existing agencies. Although these provisions are largely settled and well
understood, they are likely to be time consuming and expensive to
implement for greenhouse gases. Like Waxman-Markey and KerryLieberman, the greenhouse gas emissions data collected under any CAA
program would be important in confirming compliance with regulatory
requirements. These data would also likely complement and expand upon
data collected in EPA’s existing greenhouse gas inventory.
Perhaps the biggest concern regarding monitoring, reporting, and
verification is the failure of Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax bills to
authorize the creation of a national greenhouse gas inventory. EPA’s
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule fills this gap currently,
but EPA’s authority to assemble this inventory has been called into
question. EPA has based its authority to require greenhouse gas reporting
on CAA Section 114 for stationary sources and CAA Section 208 for
mobile sources.198 These provisions generally allow EPA to require such
reporting, recordkeeping, and monitoring as is “reasonably required” to

196. Id.; see also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam For Tax, 61
T AX LAW . 357, 377 (Winter 2008) [hereinafter Whistleblowers]. This threat has somewhat
abated over the last several years. Id. In fact, between FY 2005 and FY 2009, the number of
corporate tax returns that the IRS audited declined dramatically: in FY 2005, 43% of
corporations with assets of $250 million or more were audited; by 2009, this number had
dropped to 25%. See TRAC IRS, Despite Rising Deficits, IRS Audits of the Largest and
Richest Corp orat ions Decline, available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/new findings/v15
(last visited Jun. 24, 2010). In that time, the IRS also cut back on the number of hours it
spent auditing these corporations by one third. Id.
197. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4083 (authority for Treasury to inspect gasoline tax records).
198. 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,286–87 (Oct. 30, 2009).
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help the agency develop standards under the CAA, implement the CAA,
as well as to determine compliance with the CAA.199 Although EPA
almost certainly has authority to compile the inventory at present, if
regulation of greenhouse gases proceeds under other legislation, EPA
may lose this authority, as it arguably will no longer be collecting such
information to develop CAA standards or monitor compliance. At the
same time, some Members of Congress have introduced bills that would
strip EPA of its authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA or
otherwise delay EPA’s work on greenhouse gases, which could also
disrupt assembly and maintenance of the inventory. 200 Given the
importance of clear, comprehensive information on greenhouse gas
emissions, it may be advisable to codify EPA’s authority to continue this
vital work.
Although monitoring, reporting, and verification requirements are
essential to an effective enforcement system, not all of the greenhouse
gas control options adequately address these requirements. Indeed,
while Waxman-Markey, Kerry-Lieberman and the traditional CAA
programs all set out extensive requirements for monitoring, reporting and
verifying emissions, Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals fail
to set forth any such requirements. Even more problematic is the failure
of Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals to establish a national
greenhouse gas inventory, which—in light of the various challenges to
EPA’s authority to compile such an inventory—may lead to insufficient
information about greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.
D. Transparency
The manner in which the various greenhouse gas control options
approach transparency varies not only among the programs, but also
within the programs themselves. For example, while Waxman-Markey
and Kerry-Lieberman include provisions that ensure that greenhouse gas
emissions data are available to the public, they fail to treat the data related to
offsets in the same manner. Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax
proposals fail to set out sufficient guidelines for disseminating data.
And, while the CAA includes provisions to make emissions data
available to the public, much of the data sits in state files that are not
readily accessible. These programs may not, therefore, be sufficiently
transparent.
In many respects, transparency of greenhouse gas emissions data is the
cornerstone of any greenhouse gas control program. Making emissions
199.
200.
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data publicly available allows the public to access and analyze the
data.201 In doing so, a regulatory agency “enlists the public in the
oversight of the program and enhances the public’s acceptance of the
program.”202 Experience with other tradable permit programs has shown
that transparency of emissions data enhances enforcement: “[q]uality
assurance is easier if data are widely available; veracity-checking is
facilitated by the availability of multiple sources of information; and the
involvement of private monitors is frequently heavily dependent upon
the existence of a rich database.”203 Indeed, the public availability of
data in the Acid Rain Program, including data on emissions, compliance
and allowances, has “help[ed] to create a transparent and self-enforcing
compliance system. . .”204 This has contributed to the “high compliance
records” in the program.205 For these reasons, transparency is likely to
play an important role in the success of any greenhouse gas control
program.
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman take a similar approach to the
dissemination of emissions data. Under these bills, EPA is required to
publicly disseminate data submitted by regulated entities “as soon as
practicable” after EPA audits such data.206 There are some data, such as
confidential business information (“CBI”), that are exempt from
dissemination. Although Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman make
clear that data related to greenhouse gas emissions will not be considered
CBI,207 data available under these programs may not be as transparent as
under the Acid Rain P rogram. The EP A’s final rule for Mandatory
Reporting of Greenhouse Gases suggests that only those entities that are
already required to collect and report data using CEMS under a separate
program will be required to directly measure their emissions. Other
entities will be given a choice of using CEMS or facility-specific
calculations. Although it is likely that most of the data used for these

201. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1582.
202. Id.
203. Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable-Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons:
Lessons For Climate Change, 19 OXFORD REV. ECON . POL ’Y 400, 415 (2003) [hereinafter
Tradable-Permits Approach].
204. Id.
205. Id. at 416.
206. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 713(b)(1)(N); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note
32, § 713(b)(1)(N).
207. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 713(b)(1)(N); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note
32, § 713(b)(1)(N).
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calculations will be made available to the public, some of these data may
be claimed as CBI by reporting entities.
EPA’s recently proposed CBI regulations for the Mandatory Reporting of
Greenhouse Gases Rule provide some insight in what information will
likely be available to the public. Although EPA generally determines
what constitutes CBI on a case-by-case basis, it has indicated that, due to
the number of reporting entities and the amount of data to be submitted
by those entities, this practice would likely lead to significant delays in
making greenhouse gas emissions data available to the public.208 Under
the proposed regulations, “emissions data,” which are actual or estimated
emissions, inputs to emissions equations, and calculation methodologies,
would be publicly available, along with certain test and calibration
methods.209 Although it is unclear whether the final rule will retain this
level of transparency, legislators may want to follow EPA’s lead by
adopting similar language into pending bills.
In contrast to emissions data, Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman
limit the dissemination of data related to offset projects. For all offset
projects, Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman require an offset
project developer to submit verification reports, prepared by accredited
third-party verifiers, which set forth information necessary to determine
the quantity of greenhouse gas reductions. This information includes the
quantity of greenhouse gases reduced, avoided, or sequestered and the
methodologies used for the project.210 Waxman-Markey generally makes
these reports available to the public within 90 days after they are
received, but does not require verification reports for agriculture and
forestry offset projects to be made publicly available.211 Kerry-Lieberman
208. 75 Fed. Reg. 39,094, 39,101–02 (July 7, 2010); see also Gabriel Nelson, Emissions:
EPA expansion of GHG reporting program finished for now, GREENWIRE , June 30, 2010,
at para. 12.
209. 75 Fed. Reg. at 39,097.
210. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 736(a), (b); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32,
§ 736(a), (b).
211. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 737(a)(1). Reticence to make public information
about environmental regulation of agriculture is not new. At the state level, there has
been some legal wrangling over the public availability of information relating to farms
and agriculture. For example, M aryland’s Water Quality Improvement Act (the “WQIA”)
was enacted in 1998 in order to “address [] the health and environmental concerns caused by
agricultural runoff.” M D. CODE ANN ., AGRIC. §§ 8-801–807; see also Paul L. Sorisio, Poultry,
Waste, and Pollution: T he L ack of Enfor cem ent of Mar yland’s Water Quality
Improvement Act, 62 M D . L. REV. 1054, 1056 (2003). The “backbone” of the WQIA is
the requirement that all farms implement a nutrient management plan (“NM P”), which
sets forth a plan to manage animal waste, fertilizer, sludge and other plant nutrients on a farm.
See M D . CODE ANN ., AGRIC. § 8-801(c). Although farms are required to file summaries
of their NM Ps with the M aryland Department of Agriculture (the “M DA”), these
summaries are to be maintained for three years “in a manner that protects the identity of
the individual for whom the [NMP] was prepared.” M D . CODE ANN ., AGRIC. § 8.801.1(b).
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further limits the availability of verification reports: while it requires
verification reports related to international offset projects be made public
within ninety days of receipt, it does not require any verification reports
related to domestic offset projects be made publicly available.212 Both
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman therefore limit the transparency
of the offsets programs, making it difficult for the public to be involved
in oversight of the programs.
There appears to be little reason to keep offset verification reports
confidential. To the contrary, offsets are a publicly-created good: those
that obtain an offset are being paid from a government-created market to
voluntarily undertake actions to improve the environment. This is not an
instance of intrusive government regulation or excessive disclosure, but of
voluntary actions on which the public is relying to reduce an imminent
and substantial threat to human health and the environment. Requiring
public disclosure of the underlying data is an important aspect of this.
And, case-specific or category-specific CBI claims for certain kinds of
data could still be made, instead of declaring all domestic offsets off
limits as Kerry-Lieberman does.
It nonetheless seems that Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman
trade, to varying degrees, the public availability of offset reports for
third-party verification. While third-party verification can help ensure
the reliability of the offsets and their additionality, it is no replacement
for transparency. Many questions have already been raised about the
reliability and additionality of offsets created under the Kyoto Protocol’s
Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”). Allowing U.S. offsets to be
verified by third parties, but not vetted by the public, does not help to
dispel market distrust of these instruments. Reliance on third-party
verifiers may also be highly questionable given recent experience with
Representatives of the farming industry have asserted that these provisions are essential
to p rot ecting a farm’s comp et it ivenes s . Indeed, after a coalition of environmental
groups sought disclosure of certain NM P summaries in an action filed against the M DA
in 2008, one farming industry representative called NM Ps “critical business planning
documents,” the release of which would “impact [a farm’s] competitiveness.” M aryland Farm
Bureau, Maryland Farm Bureau Seeks Court Protection for Family Farmers, 6 SP OTLIGHT 1, 1
(Aug. 2008), quot ing t he P resident of the M aryland F arm Bureau. A nother industry
representative further asserted that the release of NM P information would lead to thirdparty enforcement suits that would only “prove [farms] are doing what the state already
enforces.” Id. at 8. T hes e s ame industry interests may have motivat ed the drafters of
Waxman-M arkey to omit any requirement that agriculture offset projects make their verification
reports publicly available.
212. Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 758(b).
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the CDM. A review conducted for World Wildlife Fund found that third
party verification reports were initially accepted only 36% of the time,
with 57% of the verification reports requiring corrections.213 Further, it
gave the highest-ranking verifier a grade of D on a scale of A to F, with
most verifiers earning Es or Fs.214 One cannot help but draw an analogy
with credit rating agencies, whose verification of the credit worthiness of
many financial instruments later turned out to be unreliable. Reliance on
third-party verification without significant oversight and auditing poses a
significant threat to confidence in the overall market and, therefore, to
the ability of the programs to meet their environmental objectives.215
For the other greenhouse gas control programs, it is not yet clear how
transparent these programs will be. To start, none of the provisions in
Cantwell-Collins address the public dissemination of emissions or
offsets data. As with other aspects of the program, this has presumably
been left to the Secretary to determine through the promulgation of
regulations. Given the large degree of discretion afforded the Secretary,
it is not clear Treasury would require the same degree of transparency
traditionally provided by environmental regulators. This can result in
significantly less information being available to the public.
A carbon tax would present perhaps the most significant hurdle for
transparency of emissions and offsets data. Under the Code, the IRS is
prohibited from disclosing any information included in a tax return,
except in certain limited circumstances.216 Thus, unless the legislation
were written to require disclosure, which the existing bills do not
require, the taxes paid and the underlying carbon use data would not be
publicly available.217 This lack of transparency may impact not only
the public understanding of greenhouse gas controls, but also the
effectiveness of the tax itself. If regulated entities subject to the tax are
unable to verify their competitors’ compliance with the tax, or believe
that there is widespread non-compliance, then they will be less likely to
comply themselves.218

213. Lambert Schneider & Lennart M ohr, Oko-Institute, V., 2010 Rating of Designated
Operational Entities Accredited under the Clean Development Mechanism (June 28, 2010),
http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/1023/2010-079-en.pdf.
214. Id.
215. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1582 (“Publicly available, high-quality data are
essential for allowance market pricing to work efficiently and for achieving emission
reductions at the lowest possible cost.”).
216. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2010); see also Whistleblowers, supra note 196, at 372.
For example, the IRS may identify those who are subject to certain excise taxes, and tax
information may be disclosed in certain judicial and administrative proceedings.
217. SEC reporting might decrease some opacity, but it is unlikely citizens could
obtain a clear view of company-level contributions to the carbon tax.
218. Understanding Deterrence, supra note 181, at 14–17.
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EPA’s traditional CAA programs afford greater transparency of data.
Almost all facility-specific records are available for inspection from
EPA and state offices. While at first blush this sounds quite transparent,
there are many hurdles that need to be crossed to actually receive these
records. These include the inability to access records other than through
in-person review; costs charged by agencies for reproduction; time delays
in gaining access to records; and CBI claims. In comparison to the capand-trade data that may be made available on the internet, the traditional
CAA authorities may provide less transparency in regards to emissions
data. Further, to the extent that greenhouse gas controls are put in place
using CAA authority, most information would likely be gathered at the
state level. In addition to posing high hurdles for data access, this could
make it difficult to gain a national-level picture of greenhouse gas
emissions controls, unless EPA were to insist on national reporting.
One final, important aspect of transparency is transparency in the
emissions market. In order for there to be effective oversight of such a
market, a regulatory agency needs sufficient data about the market,
including prices, trades, and trends.219 In fact, “[t]he more detailed
information an oversight body receives, the better its capacity to detect
trading irregularities and inconsistencies,” thereby allowing it to identify
“suspicious spikes in the market price or trade volume.”220 Each of the
proposed cap-and-trade programs provides for public dissemination of
information related to the emissions market. For instance, WaxmanMarkey requires EPA to implement a system to track emission allowances
and offset credits and to make this information available to the public.221
Similarly, Kerry-Lieberman requires EPA to implement an allowance
tracking system that is to be made publicly available.222 Kerry-Lieberman
also requires any trading organization to provide the public with trading
information in real time. This includes bids, settlement prices, and
opening and closing ranges for all greenhouse gas instruments traded
through the organization.223 And, while Cantwell-Collins has a limited
emissions market, the bill still requires that, for any trades that occur, all
relevant transaction dates, allowance quantities, and prices be “made

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See Financial Markets, supra note 21, at 10,062.
Id.
Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 724(d).
Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 724(c).
Id. § 2410.
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publicly available on a real-time basis.”224 This degree of transparency
should assist in the effective supervision of a greenhouse gas market.
As is clear from the foregoing, the various greenhouse gas options
approach transparency differently. While Waxman-Markey and KerryLieberman generally allow emissions data to be made available to the
public, they fail to make all information related to their offsets programs
available. Traditional CAA authority affords a certain degree of
transparency, but there are significant hurdles to cross to gain access to
information. Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals fail to even
address the public availability of data. This will likely affect public trust
in the program and the ability of the public to fully participate in
overseeing them.
E. Role of Citizens
Despite the central role of citizen enforcement in environmental law, it
remains unclear whether citizens will be afforded the same role in
implementing and enforcing greenhouse gas control options. Part of this
stems from the fact that citizen suits may not be necessary for overseeing
emissions markets in the cap-and-trade programs since penalties are
automatically enforced against violators. Nevertheless, several of the
options fail to provide for citizen enforcement or fail to provide data to
allow citizen enforcement—or both—even where it would be useful to
do so.
Citizens play an important role in enforcing environmental laws.
Although federal and state agencies hold the primary responsibility for
enforcement, every major environmental law includes “citizen suit”
provisions. Citizen suits allow “private citizens to enforce the laws when
the government [is] unwilling or unable to do so.”225 For instance, citizen
suits are needed to “make up the balance of necessary enforcement at
times when under-funded or over-worked agencies [cannot] ensure that
all laws are complied with.” 226 Indeed, “[c]itizen resources are an
important adjunct to governmental action to assure that these laws are
adequately enforced. In a time of limited [g]overnment resources,
enforcement through court action prompted by citizen suits is a valuable

224. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33, § 4(b)(7)(A)(ii).
225. Will Reisinger et al., Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of Cooperative
Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick Up the Slack?, 20 DUKE ENVTL . L.
& POL ’Y FORUM 1, 2 (Winter 2010) [hereinafter Limits].
226. Id.
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dimension of environmental law.”227 At the same time, citizen suits are
also needed to hold government agencies accountable where, due to
political considerations or otherwise, those agencies fail to bring enforcement
proceedings.228 This is particularly important in the context of greenhouse
gas programs, which will need to be implemented over a period of 40
years or more in states whose governors and legislators may not support
greenhouse gas regulation.
The various greenhouse gas control options take different approaches
to the role of citizens. To start, Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax
proposals do not contain any citizen suit provisions and otherwise fail to
carve out a role for citizens. Citizen enforcement is therefore unlikely to
be available under these two approaches, not only because of a lack of
statutory authority, but also—in the case of carbon taxes—a lack of data.
This leaves these programs solely in the hands of federal regulators
without a ready lever to use in the face of changing political and economic
environments over time, which may leave the programs’ effectiveness at
risk.
In contrast, Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman allow citizen suits
through existing CAA provisions.229 While this suggests some role for
citizens, these suits may have diminished utility for cap-and-trade
programs, and may not even be able to be brought.230 In regards to
utility, this will likely depend on the nature of the violation: citizen suits
are likely to be useful for various violations of offset, monitoring, and
reporting provisions. They are, however, likely to be less useful for
violations of allowable emission limits (i.e., where regulated entities
hold too few allowances). 231 This is because, like the Acid Rain
Program, both bills require penalties for such violations to be assessed
automatically. This means that they are due immediately and without

227. James R. M ay, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at
30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2003) (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. S3, 183 (daily ed. M ar.
26, 1990) (remarks of Sen. David Durenberger)).
228. Id. at 6.
229. Waxman-Markey, s upr a note 31, § 337(d); Kerry-Lieberman, s upra note
32, § 2503(c).
230. See, e.g., Limits, supra note 225, at 28–57 (citing costs and attorneys’ fees, standing,
Eleventh Amendment arguments, and the definition of diligent prosecution as barriers to
successful citizen suits).
231. All greenhouse gas provisions under Waxman-M arkey and Kerry-Lieberman
are “emission standards or limitations” subject to citizen suit provisions. Waxman-Markey,
supra note 31, § 723(b)(3); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2503(c).
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action by the enforcing agency,232 leaving little room, or apparent need,
for citizen involvement. At the same time, a citizen suit might not even
be possible for such violations. The CAA only allows such a suit “if
there is evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated.”233 Query
whether a violation would have to occur twice before a citizen could
successfully maintain a suit. 234 Moreover, to the extent USDA
would have oversight and non-discretionary duties under an offsets
program, an action may not be able to be brought against USDA as both
bills seem to preclude such an action.235
Like Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman, regulation under traditional
CAA authorities would allow citizen suits through existing CAA
provisions. In contrast to the two bills, citizen enforcement would likely
have some utility, particularly under the PSD program. In fact, because
programs under the CAA do not allow for immediate and automatic
penalties, citizen oversight could be quite useful. Citizen suits could
therefore play their traditional role of helping to encourage robust
program implementation by state and federal regulators.
It remains to be seen, however, whether significant procedural hurdles
to citizen suits will prevent them from being brought under any
greenhouse gas control option. The court-created doctrine of standing
requires plaintiffs to demonstrate an actual or imminent injury in fact
that is concrete and particularized, that is fairly traceable to the acts of
the defendant, and that can likely be redressed by a favorable court
decision.236 Although the Supreme Court found standing for Massachusetts
to bring a case against EPA to regulate greenhouse gases, it did so based
on the “special solicitude” that states enjoy in a standing analysis.237
Whether a court would find similar standing for private litigants acting
to enforce violations of a greenhouse gas program is unclear and will

232. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 723(b)(3); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32,
§ 723(b)(3).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2010). See Arnold Reitze, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW :
COMP LIANCE & ENFORCEMENT 521, 601 (2001) (CAA amendments partially overruled
Gwaltney decision that limited suits for purely past violations).
234. Even if a citizen suit could survive these barriers, there are also some procedural
hurdles that must be cleared. Before filing a suit a citizen must give EPA, the state, and
the defendant at least sixty days notice. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2010). And, a citizen may
not bring suit if EPA or the state has already brought and is diligently pursuing an
enforcement action in court. Id. This prohibition does not, however, apply to administrative
penalties, and does not foreclose the citizen from intervening in the enforcement action
as a matter of right. Id.
235. While the bills’ conforming amendments included other agencies, such as USDA,
in t he definition of “Administrator,” this w as not done for CA A Section 304. See
Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 337; Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2503.
236. See, e.g., Limits, supra note 225, at 35.
237. M assachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 514 (2007).
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depend to some degree on the future direction of the standing doctrine as
shaped by the courts.238
Accordingly, it is likely that citizens will face significant barriers to
participate in the oversight of the various greenhouse gas control
options. Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals fail to even carve
out a role for citizens, making it unlikely that citizens will be able to
participate in oversight of those programs. While the citizen suit
provisions of the CAA apply under Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman,
it is not yet clear whether citizen suits would serve any purpose, or even
be possible, under either bill given substantive and procedural limitations. It
is particularly worrisome that citizen suits related to oversight of the
USDA-administered agriculture and forestry offsets program seem to be
precluded under the two bills despite the need for enhanced citizen
oversight. At the same time, some of the same procedural limitations
that may create a barrier to citizen participation under Waxman-Markey
and Kerry-Lieberman may also create a barrier under traditional CAA
programs.
F. Role of the States
In establishing a role for states, federal greenhouse gas control
programs must engage in a careful balancing act: they must balance the
need to utilize state expertise and capacity to implement traditional
environmental programs against the need for nationwide consistency.
Nationwide consistency may be particularly undermined where a state
does not support greenhouse gas controls. A review of the various
greenhouse gas control options shows that the cap-and-trade programs
and carbon tax proposals properly reflect this balancing act by providing

238. See Limits, supra note 225, at 34–42. The discussion draft of Waxman-M arkey
did include a citizen suit provision. This provision allowed citizens to bring an action if
they suffered, or reasonably expected to suffer, harm attributable to a violation of an emissions
standard or limit ation, or EP A’s failure to perform non-discretionary duty. WaxmanMarkey Discussion Draft, § 336(a), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/
20090331/acesa_discussiondraft.pdf. The term “harm” was defined to include “any effect of
air pollution (including climate change), currently occurring or at risk of occurring, and
the incremental exacerbation of any such effect or risk that is associated with a small
incremental emission of any air pollutant . . . whether or not the effect or risk is widely
shared.” Id. This provision was deleted before the House passed the bill, and the language
about harm was put into the bill’s findings instead. It remains to be seen whether courts
will give any weight to such findings or whether further judicial development of the standing
doctrine will preclude citizen suits for climate change harms.
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states with a distinct, but diminished, role. Maintaining the states’
traditional roles under the CAA authorities may, however, prove
problematic.
In most environmental statutes, states are given the primary responsibility
for implementing and enforcing federal laws and regulations using the
“cooperative federalism” approach.239 Under this approach, the federal
government sets minimum environmental standards and the states have
the “primary responsibility” for implementing programs to meet those
standards.240 Each state is generally required “to decide which sources to
regulate and the extent to which each will be regulated” so that the
national standards are met.241 States also have the right to impose stricter
standards.242 At the same time, the federal government continues to play
a role in overseeing the state programs. The federal government is
responsible for not only providing initial approval of the programs, but
also monitoring the programs for compliance.243 This system is intended
to allow states to tailor their programs to local conditions while ensuring
sufficient uniformity among states so that minimum federal standards
are met.
State involvement in a cap-and-trade program does, however, pose
some risks to the consistency of the national market. For example, while
implementing the Acid Rain Program, New York attempted to prohibit
the sale of excess acid rain allowances from New York sources in order
to create a more stringent program.244 And when EPA created Clean Air
Mercury Rule (“CAMR”), less than half the states signed up to engage
in the trading program, leaving EPA to implement the program in the
other half of the states. At the international level, the European Union’s
Emission Trading System has been troubled by reports of certain
member states overestimating emissions and Hungary selling “used”
credits back into the open market.245 At the same time, studies have shown
that, in the United States, state penalties assessed against polluters
tend to be significantly lower than penalties assessed by the federal

239. See Limits, supra note 225, at 6.
240. STAFF OF COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE , Climate Change Legislation
Design White Paper: Appropriate Roles for Different Levels of Government 8 (2008),
ht t p ://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/D ocument s /PDF/selected_legislation/
white%20paper%20st-lcl%20roles %20final%202-22.pdf [hereinafter Appropriate Roles for
Different Levels of Government].
241. Id.
242. Id. at 8–9.
243. Limits, supra note 225, at 6.
244. The federal courts rejected this effort on the grounds that it was pre-empted by
the CAA. See generally Clean Air M arkets Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003).
245. See generally ClimateWire.com, Hungary Says Trader Bought Used Credits, Shakes
Carbon Market, M ar. 22, 2010.

136

SCHANG- CHA N VISUAL (D O N OT D EL ET E)

[VOL . 2: 87, 2010]

3/11/2016 1:31 PM

Greenhouse Gas Control Options
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

government.246 In light of the potential bias of state officials toward instate economic interests and the open opposition of some officials to
greenhouse gas regulation, giving significant authority of the trading
mechanisms of any greenhouse gas system to states could result in an
unsteady market, delay in implementation and uneven environmental
results.
Because of the paramount need for national consistency and oversight,
virtually any cap-and-trade program will diminish the role of the states
to some degree. For example, the Acid Rain Program is “one of the
most federally-oriented air pollution control programs” with a highly
centralized enforcement system.247 Experience with this program “has
shown that, for cap-and-trade programs, centralized program implementation,
including data reporting and verification, is efficient and works well.”248
Even in this highly centralized program, however, it is important to
recognize that states still play an important role in enforcement. States
have the authority, for example, to enforce monitoring requirements.249
And, about 40% of the staff for the Acid Rain Program is state and local
agency employees who conduct field audits.250
Both Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman set out a role for states
in enforcing their greenhouse gas control programs that is reminiscent of
the Acid Rain Program. Under both bills, states are prohibited from
implementing or enforcing a cap-and-trade program.251 Certain state
actions do not, however, fall within the scope of this prohibition. States
can still, for example, adopt standards, limits, regulations or programs to
reduce greenhouse gases so long as they are not implemented through
the issuance of a limited number of tradable instruments.252 In addition,
under both bills, states may be delegated the responsibility for conducting
audits of domestic offset projects.253

246. See, e.g., M ark Atlas, Enforcement Principles and Enforcement Agencies: PrincipalAgent Relationships in a Delegated Environmental Program, 41 LAW & SOC. REV. 939,
971 (2007).
247. Appropriate Roles for Different Levels of Government, supra note 240, at 2.
248. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1581.
249. Appropriate Roles for Different Levels of Government, supra note 240, at 9.
250. Beyond Playing Banker, supra note 14, at 286.
251. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 335; Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2501.
Waxman-M arkey only preempts state cap-and-trade programs from 2012 to 2017.
252. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 335; Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 2501.
253. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 738(b) (2009); Kerry-Lieberman, supra note
32, § 739(d)(1) (2009).
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For the other greenhouse gas control programs, it is not yet clear what
role states will play. Cantwell-Collins and the carbon tax proposals do
not set out any provisions related to the role of states, and do not
preempt existing state greenhouse gas programs. This could have various
outcomes. It could leave states unfettered authority to run their own
greenhouse gas trading systems, set their own renewable portfolio
standards, and otherwise continue to regulate greenhouse gases on a
state and regional basis. But Congress may preempt such state activities
or states may deem them duplicative if Cantwell-Collins or a carbon
tax is implemented. Alternatively, some combination of these scenarios
could play out. What seems clear, however, is that there appears little
room for state involvement in a carbon market, and states would have
little to no role in implementing and enforcing a federal carbon tax.
Implementation and enforcement of greenhouse gas controls through
traditional CAA authorities would rely heavily on the states because the
NSPS and PSD programs are implemented at the state level. This is
potentially problematic, as opposition to regulation of greenhouse gases
under the CAA is pronounced in some states.254 This may require EPA
to federally implement these programs in many states during a time of
serious federal budget shortfalls and significant opposition to expansion of
the role of the federal government.255 At the same time, if EPA were to
devise a cap-and-trade program under CAA Section 111, it would be
important to maintain centralized EPA control over the market
mechanisms, as was done in the Acid Rain Program and the CAMR.
From the foregoing review, it appears that most of the greenhouse gas
control options appropriately balance the role of states, involving states
in the implementation of the cap-and-trade programs while leaving the
national market and national tax provisions largely to federal agencies to
implement. The notable exception is the peril of heavy reliance on states
if greenhouse gas controls are implemented using traditional CAA
authority.
G. Penalties
The various greenhouse gas control options all establish fairly stringent
penalties for non-compliance. These penalties range from 100% to 500%
254. See, e.g., Letter from Bryan Shaw, Chairman, Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality, and Gregg Abbot, Attorney General of Texas to Lisa Jackson, Administrator, EPA,
and Alfred Armendariz, Region VI Administrator, EPA (Aug. 2, 2010) (heavily criticizing
EPA regulation of greenhouse gases under the CAA).
255. J. Cohen & D. Balz, What’s So Good About the Government, WASH . POST, Oct. 10,
2010 at A1 (public evenly split between wanting more services and higher taxes versus
fewer services and lower taxes).
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and, while these penalties are lower than those under the Acid Rain
Program, they appear sufficient to deter non-compliance. It remains
unclear, however, whether any of the proposed programs would provide
sufficient compliance assistance to help regulated entities understand
and comply with the programs’ provisions, thereby avoiding the need for
penalties in the first place.
The penalty provisions of any greenhouse gas reduction program
should ensure that potential violators face sanctions that deter illegal
behavior and encourage compliance with the program. This usually
involves civil or criminal sanctions that (1) are sufficiently stringent so
that compliance is more economically beneficial than non-compliance;256
(2) are swiftly and publicly assessed;257 and (3) are accompanied by
sufficient compliance assistance so that regulated sources can understand
and comply with requirements in an efficient and timely manner.258
Experience with the Acid Rain Program suggests that, for cap-andtrade programs, penalties that are significantly more expensive than the
cost of compliance and that are assessed quickly—even automatically—
are likely to be successful. Under the program, if a regulated entity fails
to have sufficient emissions credits to meet its compliance obligations,
penalties of $2,000 per ton of emissions (equal to almost seven times the
average market price of an emissions credit) are automatically due, and
the deficient number of credits from the entity’s compliance budget are
deducted from the following year.259
The proposed cap-and-trade programs all follow the Acid Rain Program’s
example of assessing high and swift penalties for non-compliance. Both
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman assess automatic penalties of
twice the going market rate for emissions allowances. In addition, these
bills require violators to forfeit allowances from their current or future
budgets in order to cover the excess emissions.260 Cantwell-Collins
provides even stricter penalties, requiring violators to pay five times the

256. David Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System:
Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the Unites States,
the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 M D . L. REV. 1552, 1690 (1995) (“each action must
reliably result in civil penalties that (1) dep rive t he violat or of all economic benefits
derived from the violations, and (2) place the violator in a significantly worse position
than it would have been if it had complied.”).
257. Reinventing, supra note 183, at 60–61.
258. Id. at 67–70.
259. See, e.g., Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1578.
260. Waxman-Markey, supra note 31, § 723; Kerry-Lieberman, supra note 32, § 723.
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market rate for emissions allowances.261 The penalty is immediately due
and payable to the Secretary.262
The proposed carbon tax bills do not contain separate penalty provisions
and rely on the Code’s existing penalty provisions. The Code includes a
“variety of civil penalties,”263 with “over 600 distinct civil tax penalty
provisions.”264 For example, the IRS has the right, which would presumably
apply to carbon tax penalties, to assess a 100% penalty on taxpayers that
have willfully failed to collect, truthfully account for, or pay taxes that
are due to the federal government.265 In addition, the Code includes
criminal sanctions.266 The civil tax code penalties are significantly less
than those provided in the cap-and-trade bills. And, unlike the Acid Rain
Program, they are not automatically assessed and due, but require detection
and assessment by Treasury. This could delay enforcement and give
violators the chance to escape detection.
EPA’s traditional CAA authorities provide for significant daily
penalties for non-compliance, plus assessment of penalties to recoup any
economic benefits enjoyed by the violator due to non-compliance.267
Penalties are not automatically due, however, and calculation of the
economic benefit requires application of a complex economic model.
Like a carbon tax, EPA or states must detect the violation and decide to
enforce, neither of which may occur. Further, penalties are usually assessed
through settlements that result in payment of less than the maximum
fine.268 Assessment of penalties also requires significant resources to
bring administrative or judicial actions.
At the same time, although compliance with CAA requirements has
not been well studied, there is reason to be concerned about relying on
traditional CAA programs. While compliance with the Acid Rain
Program appears to be over 99%,269 compliance with the more routine
permitting and emission requirements of the NSPS, PSD, NESHAPs and
other programs appears to be far less robust. A Council on Environmental
261. Cantwell-Collins, supra note 33, § 4(a)(5) (2009). We do not have sufficient data
to comment on w hether t here w ould be a mat erial difference bet w een a penalty
for 200%, 500%, and 1000% in deterring non-compliance.
262. Id. § 4(a)(5)(C).
263. Id.
264. Craig A. M ax IV, Hand-Holding, Brow-Beating, and Shaming into Compliance: A
Com par ative Survey of Enforcement Mechanisms for Tax Com pliance, 40 VAND .
J. T RANSNAT’L L. 541, 565, 573 (M ar. 2007) [hereinafter Hand Holding].
265. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (2010); see also United States v.
Novelli, 381 F. Supp. 2d. 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting United States v. Jones, 33
F.3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999)).
266. Interplay, supra note 194, at 1456.
267. Stationary Source, supra note 121, at 272–80.
268. Hodas, supra note 256, at 1609.
269. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1576.
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Quality study in the 1990s estimated that industrial source compliance
with CAA requirements was as low as 35% resulting in emissions being
about 10% above regulatory levels.270 Therefore, the traditional CAA
penalty authorities are much less nimble, much less certain to be
assessed and likely less effective than using a well designed cap-andtrade model.
Although penalties are important, they are not sufficient to assure
compliance. Compliance assistance—creating programs that are easily
implemented; working with regulated entities to understand their industries
and concerns; answering questions and providing guidance—is a crucial
element of enforcement. Indeed, EPA staff have credited the success of
the Acid Rain Program to extensive collaboration with regulated entities,
including provision of compliance assistance—and not to draconian
penalties.271 From the pending greenhouse gas control options, it is not
clear whether sufficient resources would be allocated to the implementing
agencies to ensure robust compliance assurance efforts.
Accordingly, the various greenhouse gas control options all appear to
impose sufficiently stringent penalties to deter non-compliance. Indeed,
all of the cap-and-trade programs assess penalties that are well above the
market rate for emission allowances. And, while the carbon tax proposals
and traditional CAA authority assess smaller penalties, these penalties
are still significant. It is important to note nonetheless that, unlike the
cap-and-trade programs, penalties under the carbon tax proposals and
traditional CAA authority are not assessed automatically and, as such,
may take some time and resources to detect. At the same time, while the
various greenhouse gas control programs all appear to have sufficient
penalty provisions, it is not yet clear whether any of these programs will
have sufficient compliance assistance to help regulated entities meet
their compliance obligations.

270. See Clifford Russell, “M onitoring and Enforcement,” in P UBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Paul Portney ed., 1990).
271. Fundamentals, supra note 8, at 1579–80.
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III. CONCLUSION
Given the controversial nature of greenhouse gas controls, the long
timeline it will take to implement greenhouse gas control programs, and
the potentially very broad reach of these programs across the economy,
it will be critical that the chosen control method can be enforced with
relative consistency, fairness, ease, and immediacy over the life of the
program and throughout the country. Our review of the various greenhouse
gas control options shows that there are relative strengths and weaknesses,
as well as important tradeoffs to be made in the enforcement provisions
of each of the leading candidate programs. In particular:
•

•

•

142

Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman lower implementation
costs to the regulated community, but bring tremendous
regulatory complexity. While these programs generally contain
strong and important monitoring, reporting and verification
requirements, they fail to provide for strong and transparent
reporting and verification provisions in regards to offsets,
particularly forestry and agricultural offsets. While the bills
allow for citizen suits, the utility and availability of these suits
are limited in a cap-and-trade program, and the bills inexplicably
exempt agricultural and forestry offsets from them. The bills
necessarily rely on states to assist in implementing the
programs, but rightfully place oversight of emissions markets
with federal authorities. These programs will take a significant
amount of time to implement and promise significant political
conflict and an ongoing stream of litigation.
Cantwell-Collins proposes a far simpler scheme than the
leading cap-and-trade proposals, but it would likely also bring
higher implementation costs to the regulated community. It
fails to create a central inventory of greenhouse gas emissions
and forecloses citizen enforcement of its provisions, leaving it
sorely lacking in transparency. At the same time, the program
places implementation in the hands of Treasury, which has
little expertise in administering such programs.
Carbon tax proposals promise even greater ease of
implementation, but will not bring the synergies and lower
costs that cap-and-trade models promise. The bills also fail to
explain significant program details, and the enforcement efforts
may be lacking if they follow existing federal tax procedures.
Like Cantwell-Collins, the carbon tax bills fail to create a
national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, lack
transparency, and do not allow a role for citizen enforcement.
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•

Reliance on traditional EPA authority under the CAA faces
significant barriers to optimizing program implementation.
Although the enforcement provisions are strong and largely
transparent with the opportunity for citizen enforcement, this
approach relies heavily on states at a time when some state
authorities actively oppose greenhouse gas controls, potentially
setting up a significant battle between federal and state
authorities and potentially undermining program effectiveness.

Our review further suggests that there are some mitigation measures
that could be taken to help ensure that a greenhouse gas control
programs can be efficiently and successfully implemented to meet its
environmental goals. Some of these measures include:
•
•

•
•

•
•

Congress should explicitly give EPA authority to create a robust
greenhouse gas inventory with carefully prescribed CBI
provisions that mirror EPA’s existing approach.
Offsets for forestry and agriculture should not be included in
the program design if they are regulated by USDA alone. At
the same time, these offsets should not be laden with special
provisions that obscure their transparency and the additionality
of their emissions reductions and should not be exempt from
citizen oversight.
All offset programs should be transparent to the public, with
verification reports made readily available to the public.
Agency expertise should determine agency function in the
greenhouse gas control program. Giving USDA or FERC
oversight authority of certain program elements may undermine
the programs.
The ability for citizens to participate in the oversight of the
greenhouse gas control program should be carefully considered
and facilitated in all programs.
Given the potentially conflicting roles of states, it is likely
necessary for the greenhouse gas control program to limit
state involvement and increase federal involvement, as compared
to the cooperative federalism model used in traditional
environmental regulations.
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All greenhouse gas control programs should be accompanied
by robust compliance assurance programs to help regulators
understand regulated sources and to help regulated sources
understand regulatory requirements.

Enforcement is usually considered the last element in environmental
programs—it is what regulators turn to when regulated entities fail to
abide by the rules. But as this review has shown, enforcement considerations
are central in ensuring environmental effectiveness and, as such, should
inform the design and policy choices made around federal greenhouse
gas control options.

144

